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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
R. Michael Anderson and Robert H. Anderson appeal the August 9,2002 order of the 
district court denying their petition for removal as a wrongful lien the respondent Wilshire 
Investments, L.L.C. $4.9 million trust deed filed against the Andersons' 61 acre property, and 
denial of the Andersons' request for attorney's fees and costs. The Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2(3)(j), then transferred this case to 
the Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). This Court acquired jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Whether in a summary disposition proceeding under the Wrongful Lien Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 et seq, a trial court adjudicating a petition to remove a lien as 
wrongful, has subject matter jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) to nullify 
recording of a trust deed as wrongful, when by uncontroverted evidence it is shown at the 
time of its recording that a trust deed was: 
—groundless; or 
-contains a material misstatement of fact; or 
—contains a false claim. 
This issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law for which the Court of Appeals shall 
grant the District Court no deference, applying a correction of error standard. (Russell v. 
Thomas, 2000 UT App 82> Andersons preserved this issue for appeal by their argument 
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before the court on May 8,2002, their notice of objection to the proposed order from the May 
8,2002 hearing, their reply memorandum in support of that objection; their argument before 
the court on July 17,2002, their notice of objection to the order proposed order from the July 
17, 2002 hearing and their amended reply memorandum in support of that objection. 
Issue #2: Where in a summary disposition proceeding a court hearing a petition to 
remove a lien as wrongful refuses to weigh or consider the affidavit evidence presented to 
it, because the court determines that without full discovery under the Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure it cannot properly adjudicate the claims before it; can the court nevertheless make 
findings of fact that disposes of those claims with prejudice? 
This is a question of law for which the Supreme Court shall grant the District Court 
no deference, applying a correction of error standard. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P. 2d 893, 896 
(Utah 1993). Andersons preserved this issue for appeal by the arguments made in their notice 
of objection to the proposed order from the May 8,2002 hearing, their reply memorandum 
in support of that objection; their argument before the court on July 17, 2002, their notice 
of objection to the order proposed order from the July 17, 2002 hearing and their amended 
reply memorandum in support of that objection. In any event, Rule 52(b) Ut.R.Civ.P. 
provides fo review of the sufficiency of the court's findings in a bench trial. 
Issue #3: Where in a summary disposition proceeding the only evidence presented to 
a court is by affidavit; does the failure of the respondent lien holder to controvert the 
petitioner's averments on facts that are dispositive of the merits of the case, require a court 
7 
to grant the petition for removal of the lien? 
The uncontroverted facts before this Court present questions of purely statutory 
construction, which are reviewed for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). The court only applied the law to one fact (the 
Andersons' signature on the trust deed), but in the event this involves the application of law 
to the facts, it is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 
P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). Andersons preserved this issue for appeal by the arguments 
made in their memorandum in chief to the court; their argument before the court on May 8, 
2002, their notice of objection to the proposed order from the May 8, 2002 hearing, their 
reply memorandum in support of that objection; their argument before the court on July 17, 
2002, their notice of objection to the order proposed order from the July 17, 2002 hearing 
and their amended reply memorandum in support of that objection. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to this 
appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the body of this 
brief. At Addendum C the Wrongful Lien Act, located at Utah Code Annotated Sections 38-
9-1 through 38-9-7, at Addendum D the Effect of Recording Act, located at Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 57-4a-l through 57-4a-4 and at Addendum E the Conveyances Act, 
located at Utah Code Annotated Sections 57-1-1 through 57-1-44 are fully set forth in the 
addenda hereto. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 29, 2001 Wilshire instructed the recording of a $4.9 million trust deed 
against the Andersons' 61 acre parcel of land in Midway, Utah. Wilshire's refusal to 
advance at the time of closing $1.5 million of the $3.9 million loan secured by the 
Andersons' 61 acre property1, caused the Andersons to petition (R.l- 11) under Utah Code 
Ann. §38-9-1 et seq (The Wrongful Lien Act) alleging that the deed of trust in favor of 
Wilshire Developments was wrongful. Wilshire Investments filed a cross-petition and 
supporting affidavits (R. 32-36; R. 141-148). 
The court ruled the Andersons' signatures on the $4.9 million trust deed to Wilshire 
conclusively proved the trust deed was expressly authorized under other sections of the 
Wrongful Lien Act and other State statutes, and so denied the Andersons' petition for 
summary nullification. (R. 469 @37) But the court also ruled that the Andersons' claims 
under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) were viable and that the Andersons could prosecute those 
claims. (R. 469@37) 
After the Andersons objected to Wilshire's form of order. (R. 163-166) On May 22, 
2002 the court, in response to those objections, signed a minute entry stating, 
"The Court received a fax from Mr. Ady entitled Order Denying Petition for 
Nullification of Wrongful Lien. There is nothing for the Court to rule upon at 
this time. There appears to be a disagreement as to the form of the proposed 
order. "(R.m) 
^he remaining $1 million in vigorish on the Andersons' trust deed to Wilshire 
apparently being claimed by it as a part of its loan origination fee. 
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Appellants, in an attempt to obtain a ruling from the court and in an effort to avoid 
appeal, filed a Motion for New Trial (R. 238-239), supporting memorandum (R. 225-237) 
and affidavit (R. 220-223), asserting that a trust deed is not expressly authorized by statute 
if it violates the express prohibitions in subsection 38-9-4(3) of the Wrongful Lien Act. A 
Motion/Objection Hearing was scheduled for July 17, 2002. 
Preliminary to the rehearing Appellants served Wilshire with a subpoena duces tecum 
returnable before the court at the July 17,2002 hearing. (R. 268-269) Among the documents 
subpoenaed were those relating to: 
— Wilshire's claim it waived recordation of mortgage documents required for the 
advance of the $1.5 million loan principal it withheld from the Andersons, and 
— Wilshire's admission it withheld $1.5 million of the loan principal, authorized 
release of $2.05 million of the escrowed funds and unilaterally instructed recordation 
of the trust deed against the Andersons' property, because it "suspected" the the 
Springs of St. Moritz Resort, L.L.C. was not acting in good faith. (R. 262-267) 
Wilshire Investments entirely refused to produce at the July 17,2002 hearing (or otherwise) 
any of the documents subpoenaed. (R. 470 @26) 
At the second hearing, the court denied Petitioners' motion for a new hearing and re-
affirmed its May 8, 2002 verbal rulings including its finding that the Andersons had an 
action against Wilshire under section 38-9-4(3) of the Wrongful Lien Act. (R.470@5; 
R.470@8; R.470@51; R.470@52) When in its proposed form of order Wilshire substituted 
10 
a reference to Section 38-9-7(4) for Section 38-9-4(3) of the Act, Andersons again objected. 
(R. 280-282) 
After further briefing on these objections2, including reference to the court's repeated 
statements it would not weigh the evidence without further discovery3, the court overruled 
the Andersons' objections. Appellants appeal the entire August 9, 2002 order, which 
purports to dismiss only a "portion" of the Andersons' wrongful lien claim, but concludes 
the Wilshire lien was expressly authorized by Utah law and that it was not a wrongful lien. 
(R. 304-306) Also appealed is the order denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial or Re-
Hearing under Rule 59(a) Ut.R.Civ.P. and its denial of Petitioners' claim for attorney's fees 
and costs. (R. 470@ 11; R.470@ 12; R.470@ 15; R.470@ 54) 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. All evidence before the district court was submitted by affidavit. The Andersons' 
evidence on dispositive issues was uncontroverted. 
2. In June of 2001 the Andersons agreed to sell for $9.4 million their 61 acre 
property, known as the Resort property, in Midway, Utah (which appraised at $9.2 million 
dollars in 2000), to a development company, the Springs of St. Moritz Resort, L.L.C. (the 
"Springs"). (R. 442) Because the Springs did not have the funds to complete the purchase 
of the Andersons' 61 acres, it brought in an Idaho investor, Jay Hulet, as an additional equity 
2See the Petitioners Notice of Objections and Amended Reply Memorandum 
(R.273-277; R.292-298). 
3
 See R.469@26; R.469@ 36 and 470 @ 9; R.470@ 46. 
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interest and acquired rights to purchase with a down payment of $1.5 million, Jay Hulet's 
lands in Idaho. (R. 441) These lands were valued at $15 million. 
3. The Springs also acquired the rights to purchase for $2,365 million, twenty plus 
acres adjacent to the Andersons' Midway, Utah property (R. 440-441). This adjacent parcel 
was known as the Johnson property. 
4. Once the Springs had acquired the right to purchase the Anderson, Johnson and 
Hulet properties, it brought in a purported hard money lender, Wilshire Investments, L.L.C. 
(Wilshire). Wilshire was to front the $3,953 million necessary to complete the Springs' 
purchase of the Johnson and Hulet properties. These funds would be advanced to the Springs 
under the terms of a promissory note with a face value of $4.9 million, secured by mortgages 
or trust deeds for the same value on the Johnson and Hulet properties (R. 440-441). 
5. Because the Hulet properties would have a loan to value ratio of less than 33%, the 
Springs would then obtain construction financing to take out the Wilshire hard money loan, 
commence construction on the Johnson property and then complete the purchase of the 
Andersons' 61 acres (R. 440-441). 
6. On August 16,2001 as an inducement to the Andersons to permit the recording of 
the Wilshire trust deed for $4.9 million on the Andersons' 61 acres, Wilshire advised R. 
Michael Anderson that Wilshire was also requiring a trust deed on the Andersons' property 
because: 
i. the Andersons would benefit from Wilshire providing the loans to the Springs 
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of St. Moritz for the purchase of the Johnson and Hulet properties, so that 
the Springs would be able to use those properties as collateral to obtain 
construction financing to take out the Wilshire $4.9 million loan and purchase 
the Andersons' 61 acres; and 
ii. Wilshire was requiring the trust deed on the Andersons 61 acres to ensure they 
would sell it to the Springs; and 
iii. In the event of default Wilshire would foreclose upon the Johnson and Hulet 
properties, but not upon the Andersons land (R. 438-441). 
7. By a letter dated August 16, 2001, David Turcotte, a Salt Lake attorney and one 
of the principals of the Springs, confirmed the substance of Wilshire's representations to the 
Andersons (R. 438-439). Before the Andersons would provide Wilshire with the trust deed 
on the 61 acres, they required cross-collateralization on the Hulet properties in Idaho. To 
fulfill this requirement the Springs executed a mortgage for $9.4 million to the Andersons, 
to be recorded as a second mortgage (behind the Wilshire $4.9 million mortgage) on the 
Hulet properties in Idaho (R. 438). 
8. On August 20,2001 Wilshire paid $2,365 million into the trust account of Security 
Title, the escrow agent, for the purchase of the Johnson property (R. 437). Security Title was 
also the escrow agent on the closing on the Hulet properties in Idaho, and both the Utah and 
Idaho closing were to occur simultaneously. The $2,365 million in funds were to be dealt 
with pursuant to Wilshire's escrow instructions of August 21,2001. (R. 436; R.444, ex. G) 
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On August 21, 2001 the Andersons deposited with Security Title their trust deed for $4.9 
million to Wilshire on the 61 acres in Midway, Utah. (R. 438) 
9. On August 22, 2001 Wilshire amended the closing instructions in its letter of 
August 21,2001 (R. 437-438, R.444, ex. G). In substance, the amendment provided that so 
long as the $2,365 million for the Utah closing was not released into the Utah closing until 
the $1.5 million for the Idaho closing was in place, documents could be recorded in Utah 
independent of the recording of documents in Idaho. 
10. The Andersons were notified of this change and their concurrence requested. 
Specifically relying on Wilshire's August 22, 2001 amended closing instructions that the 
$2,365 million in Utah would not be released until the $1.5 million had been advanced and 
documents had recorded in Idaho; on August 24,2001 the Andersons' amended their closing 
instructions to allow the recording of the trust deed to Wilshire on the 61 acres, independent 
of the Idaho closing (R. 436; R.444, ex.H). 
11. After August 24, 2001 but prior to August 29, 2001, Wilshire, without notice to 
the Andersons, discharged Security Title as the escrow agent on the Idaho closing. Then, on 
August 29, 2001 Wilshire, again without notice to the Andersons, reversed its August 22, 
2001 closing instructions to Security Title and instructed the immediate recording of 
documents in Utah and the release of most of the $2,365 million to the Utah payees (R. 435). 
The Andersons' trust deed to Wilshire on the 61 acres was recorded on August 29, 2001. 
Security Title released funds the next day (R. 435; R.444, ex.I). 
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12. Wilshire's deliberate refusal to advance the $1.5 million for the Springs purchase 
of the Hulet properties, deprived the Andersons of all consideration Wilshire promised in 
return for a trust deed on their 61 acres; which included the collateral for the Springs to 
obtain construction financing and purchase the Andersons' 61 acres and also deprived 
Andersons of the $9.4 million cross-collateralization for the $4.9 million trust deed to 
Wilshire on the Andersons' 61 acres. 
13. On February 85 2002 the Andersons served Wilshire with notice that their trust 
deed on the 61 acres was a wrongful lien and must be removed. (R. 443) Wilshire refused 
and on June 28, 2002 Barnes Bank, the holder of $4.5 million in prior security on the 61 
acres, foreclosed the Andersons off the 61 acre property. But for Wilshire's refusal to 
remove their lien, the Andersons would have sold the 61 acres to other buyers or re-financed 
it. (R. 429) 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 38-9-1(6) of the Wrongful Lien Act defines a wrongful lien. Subpart (a) of 
that definition requires that at the time of recording a lien be expressly authorized by some 
other provision of the Wrongful Lien Act, by some other State statute or by a Federal statute. 
Clearly, if something is expressly prohibited by statute it is not expressly authorized by 
statute and Section 38-9-4(3) of the Act categorically outlaws certain kinds of liens. In 
particular, it defines as wrongful trust deeds that at the time of recording are groundless, 
contain a material misstatement or assert a false claim. That such liens are included within 
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the definition of wrongful lien recited in Section 38-9-1(6) of the Act, is made explicit by the 
operative language in section 38-9-4(3) of the Act that: "...who records... a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1... having reason to know that the document ...(b) is groundless; 
or (c) contains a material misstatement or false claim." is liable for treble damages. 
Referring again to the language in Section 38-9-l(6)(a), Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4 is 
one of the State statutes incorporated into the requirements of the Wrongful Lien Act. 
Rebuttal of any of the presumptions set up by §57-4a-4 of the Effects of Recording Act (i.e. 
Subsection (d) proper delivery of document, Subsection (e) necessary consideration given, 
Subsection (f) beneficiary acted in good faith at all times, Subsection (j) recitals in document 
are true), removes from a document the benefit of the express authority for its recording 
provided by the presumptions imposed by that Act. 
In effect, the court below disavowed Section 38-9-l(6)(a) and instead relied solely 
upon Section 38-9-l(6)(c) of the Act. By reading down (or effectively entirely reading out) 
one Subsection of the Act that is in pari materia with another Subsection, the court violated 
longstanding rules of statutory construction. Furthermore, when the statutory definition of 
wrongful lien incorporates other Sections of that statute and other statutes of this State, a 
court lacks jurisdiction to construe that definition so that its explicit reference to other parts 
of the same statute or to other statutes of this State, is mooted. 
Appellants' averments on essential and dispositive facts were uncontroverted (i.e. the 
specific representation by Wilshire to Andersons that it would finance the purchase of the 
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Hulet property, Andersons reliance on those representations, Wilshire's issuance of closing 
instructions consistent with those representations, Wilshire's secret reversal of those closing 
instructions to obtain recording of the $4.9 million trust deed against the Andersons' 61 acre 
property, the resulting deprivation of the Andersons $9.4 million cross-collateralization 
against the Hulet property and the loss of the $9.4 million sale of the 61 acres to the Springs). 
In fact, Wilshire in its affidavit admitted that it refused to advance the $1.5 million in 
funding because of suspicions that the developer, the Springs of St. Moritz Resort, L.L.C. 
(owned by David G. Turcotte and Brent B. Woodson) was not acting in good faith. Yet 
Wilshire's motives are belied by the fact that until September 10, 2002 it never took any 
action against the Springs or its principals to recover amounts purportedly owed to Wilshire 
by them and to this day has not served the Springs with any notice of default. 
On these uncontroverted facts, Wilshire's intentional and knowing acts causing the 
wrongful recording of its trust deed on the Andersons' 61 acre property, causing the Springs 
to default in its purchase of Andersons 61 acre property and depriving the Springs of the 
Hulet properties (the collateral for the construction financing that would pay out the monies 
owing to Wilshire on its trust deed on the Andersons' 61 acres); show Wilshire's lien was 
not only groundless (it was overstated by at least $1.5 million and probably $2.5 million), it 
also proves that lien contained material misstatements and false claims. These same 
uncontroverted facts rebut the presumptions raised by Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4 and show 
Wilshire's trust deed was not authorized for recording because of mis-delivery of the trust 
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deed from the Andersons, because of lack of consideration for that trust deed, and because 
of bad faith by Wilshire and because of false recitals in that trust deed. 
The Andersons were and are entitled to a judgment nullifying the Wilshire trust deed 
as a wrongful lien. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Wrongful Lien Act is Remedial 
1. Wilshire's mala fides is declared out of its own mouth. In a letter dated February 
25, 2002, its legal counsel asserts, 
"... Wilshire never had possession of the Trust Deed, did not record the Trust 
Deed, and did not even direct or instruct any party to record the Trust Deed. 
...Wilshire played no role whatsoever in the arrangement between Springs and 
your clients or in the recordation of the Trust Deed." (R. 444, ex. S) 
This letter was written by Eric Pearson, the legal counsel that handled the escrow transaction 
for Wilshire. After disavowing all dealings between Wilshire and the Andersons, he then 
asserts, 
"...the Andersons ... will find themselves liable for any damages incurred by 
Wilshire as a result of any improper delay, hindrance or impediment to 
Wilshire's exercise of its remedies as beneficiary under the Trust Deed. " 
[emphasis added] 
Wilshire in it's first response to the Andersons' claim of wrongful lien reveals its true colors. 
It claimed the full benefit of the trust deed (including the $1.5 million it never advanced) 
while at the same time denying any contact with the Andersons. Apparently, Mr. Pearson 
did not bother to read paragraph 6 of the Promissory Note from the Springs to Wilshire. 
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(R.444, ex. O) It specifically recites a trust deed on the Andersons' 61 acres as security for 
the note. 
2. In a Notice of Default filed with the Wasatch County Recorder on September 10, 
2002 as Entry 248503, Book 0576, Page 0287-0289, Wilshire claims $8,546,106.60 as owing 
on the note, with interest accruing at 38% per annum on at least $6,572,902.40 of that 
amount. See Addendum G. But see exhibit P at page 332 of the Record which contains a 
letter dated January 25, 2002 faxed to this counsel by Mr. Pearson in response to a request 
for a pay-off amount on the Wilshire trust deed. This recites a loan balance of $7,099,814.94 
plus the value of one condominium unit which brings it to approximately $8,500,000.00 with 
interest accruing at $8,849.31 per day. As of September 10,2002 that would put the amount 
due in excess of $10,000,000.00. It appears that under either balance, Wilshire is still 
claiming for the $1.5 million it defaulted in advancing, the $1 million in vigorish it never 
earned and perhaps the condominium it defaulted in funding. 
3. Paragraph 5 of the January 25, 2002 letter contains the amazing assertion that 
Wilshire has waived its own default (i.e. its refusal to advance the $1.5 million for the 
purchase of the Hulet property). 
4. This is a case of first impression regarding a trust deed signed by the owners of 
land, claiming that a trust deed signed by them was wrongfully recorded and therefore a 
wrongful lien. However, in the larger context of cases contesting the validity of deeds for 
land, on numerous occasions courts have applied the bona fide purchaser rule even where 
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there was no overt misconduct. For example, in Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Ut.App. 
1990) this Court cut off a purchaser's claim to land because it was not a bona fide purchaser 
and in Luddington v. Bodenvest Ltd., 855 P.2d 204 (Utah 1993) the Court nullified a trust 
deed where the lender advanced funds that were used for the benefit of the general partner 
but not the limited partners. 
5. Appellants, the Andersons, argue the Wrongful Lien Act must be applied 
remedially so that: 
i. Whether a trust deed is authorized by statute {see Utah Code §38-9-l(6)(a)) 
requires reference to §57-1-19(3) and §57-4a-4 Utah Code Ann.; and 
ii. The incorporation by reference into §38-9-1(6) of the terms found in sub-
paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of §38-9-4(3) Utah Code Ann., is given full scope and 
effect, thus requiring the obligation underlying a trust deed to be valid; 
6. But Appellee Wilshire Investments, L.L.C. argues for a superficial construction 
that limits a court's review to the face of the trust deed, so that Utah Code Ann. §38-9-
l(6)(c), requiring that a trust deed be signed by an owner of the liened land, supersedes all 
other terms in the Wrongful Lien Act, negates Utah Code Ann. §38-9-l(6)(a), moots its 
reference to §57-1 -19(3), ignores and renders surplus the provisions in §3 8-9-4(3)(b) and (c) 
(imposing treble damages liens that are groundless, contain a material misstatement or false 
claim) and in the result provides the sole criteria for finding a trust deed a wrongful lien. 
7. Wilshire's stance should not be understated: at the summary trial the court opined 
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that even if a trust deed signed by an owner was stolen at gunpoint and recorded, it could not 
be a wrongful lien (R.469 @ 35, R.469 @ 36). 
8. The correct construction of Subsection 38-9-7(4) of the Act , argued for by 
Appellants, provides a court with jurisdiction to examine the circumstances of a trust deed's 
delivery and of the creation of the obligation underlying a lien. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4), 
which controls removal of recorded liens, is paralleled by Utah Code Ann. §38-9-6(4) which 
controls recording of proposed liens. In reviewing a proposed lien instrument, a court is 
restricted to review of the face of the document, excepting that it may determine the truth of 
the contents of the lien document or determine the legal rights of the parties; but only to the 
extent necessary to determine whether the lien instrument is recordable. 
9. At the back end of the process, the drafters of the Wrongful Lien Act dropped the 
language restricting a court to review of the face of the lien document. Subsection 38-9-7(4) 
of the Act instead only denies a summary disposition court jurisdiction to determine any 
other property or legal rights of the parties, that is, other than those property or legal rights 
which determine whether the lien is wrongful (ie. groundless, contains a material 
misstatement or false claim). Such a construction is remedial and in compliance with Utah 
Code Ann. §68-3-2 . See Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Miller, 2001 UT App 247, TJ25 and 
cases cited therein for the proposition that a statute must be construed as a whole and not in 
a piecemeal fashion. 
10. Interpreting Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4) this way makes full use of Utah Code 
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Ann. §38-9-4(3) and avoids the prohibition in Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ^ }23, where the 
Court affirmed: '"[AJny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative 
or superfluous is to be avoided.'" citing State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). 
11. Appellee, Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., argues that the Wrongful Lien Act is an 
insular code, complete unto itself, and must be construed by reference only to its own internal 
parts4. But Appellee's strained construction is contrary to Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^ fl7, 
where the Court ruled that where a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous legislative 
intent is best inferred from the plain language of the statute. 
12. Accordingly, the rule invoked by Utah County v. Orem City 699 P.2d 707, 709 
(Utah 1985) that, 
"If it is natural or reasonable to think that the understanding of the legislature 
or of per sons affected by the statute would be affected by another statute, then 
those statutes should be considered to be in pari materia, construed with 
reference to one another and harmonized if possible. ", 
citing Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction §51.03 at 468 (4th Ed. 1984), controls in this 
case and requires reference to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19(3) and reference to Appellants' 
rebuttal of the presumptions in Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4. 
13. Only if a statute is ambiguous will the Court resort to other modes of 
construction. See O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279,281 (Utah 1998). 
4This claim is belied by Section 38-9-2(1 )(a)&(b) of the Utah Code Annotated 
which make the Act generally applicable to all real property liens. Contrast this with 
Section 38-9-2(3)'s exception from the Act's operation of Mechanics' Liens, which liens 
are governed by provisions specific to Title 38, Chapter 1 of the Utah Code. 
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The same analysis requires that § 38-9-l(6)(a) and §38-9-l(6)(c) of the Utah Code Ann. be 
granted equal dignity and considered in pari materia. Nothing in this Act suggests that these 
two sub-paragraphs should be construed otherwise and case law {see Lyon @ %\ 7) holds that 
both sub-paragraphs are to be given full effect. 
14. Addendum F to Appellant's brief is the Bill Summary for the Wrongful Lien 
Amendment Act of 1997, prepared by legislative counsel assisting with this bill. Paragraph 
2 of the Bill Summary makes specific reference to good faith liens. Such liens by definition 
do not fall within the class of crank filings, such as purported "common law" liens to which 
Appellee would limit the Act. Instead, the Bill Summary's reference to removing a cloud on 
title signifies an intent that the amendments were to be remedial. 
15. Wilshire' s strained interpretation is inconsistent with other legislative enactments 
dealing with the same subject matter. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 finds the legislature 
imposing treble damages on beneficiaries of trust deeds signed by owners of land, lawfully 
and properly recorded. A fortiori, where a trust deed signed by owners is not properly 
recorded the treble damages remedy in Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3)is even more applicable. 
16. Bearing in mind Appellants rebuttal of Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4(d)&(e)'s 
presumption of valid delivery for recording of that instrument and rebuttal of the claim that 
promised consideration was given for it, applying Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3)(b) and Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-4(3)(c) to the facts of this case manifests the proper reading of the 
Wrongful Lien Act: 
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i. where a trust deed recites $4.9 million as the amount it secures, but $1.5 
million of the $3.9 million to be advanced under that trust deed was 
unilaterally withheld, then there is a material misstatement of the amount 
secured; and 
ii. where a trust deed asserts an interest in land but its beneficiary has refused to 
perform the conditions precedent to its acquiring an interest in that land, then 
the trust deed recites a false claim. 
In either case the trust deed is groundless. 
17. Only by applying Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) to this case in this manner does 
one avoid the prohibition in paragraph 23 of the Lund decision against making sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) superfluous. 
18. Another wrongful lien case, Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 
1105, 1111 (Ut.App.1997) defines the term groundless. In Siggard, the purchaser filed a 
notice of interest against the seller's entire 38 acres, rather than the 16 acres (part of the 38) 
being purchased. The trial court found such a lien to be groundless. Although Siggardpre-
dates the 1997 amendments, the pre-amendment^c/ required that a lien claimant not file a 
lien document knowing it was, "forged, groundless, or contained] a material misstatement 
or false claim."(c/ Section 38-9-4(3)). Similarly, in Gold Oil Land Development 
Corporation v. Davis, 611 P.2d 711 (Utah 1980) recordation of a deed that was improperly 
delivered and recorded without full consideration was canceled. 
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19. Appellants do not dispute that the evidentiary burden is upon them to prove that 
the trust deed, although facially valid, is unsupported by an underlying obligation. However, 
once that burden is met the prohibitions in Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3), rebuttal of the 
presumptions in Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4 and the requirements in Utah Code Ann. §57-1-
19(3), are controlling. Rejecting this authority (R.292-298; R.273-277) the court below 
refused to even consider Appellants uncontroverted evidence, and instead held as a matter 
of law that the statute was designed exclusively for trust deeds which were not signed by the 
owners of the land as required by Section 38-9-l(6)(c) of the Act. 
20. Although the court ruled on whether the trust deed was authorized by statute (see 
Spear v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, f l l ) , it refused to reference the statutes relevant to that 
conclusion and would not find on the facts proffered to it that bore directly on that issue. It 
is error for a court to make a finding on an issue controlled by a statute without specifically 
referencing relevant statutory criteria, see Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338 (Utah 1999). No 
explanation was offered for the court's use of Section 38-9-l(6)(c) to entirely supplant the 
operation of Section 38-9-l(6)(a) . 
21. Similarly, the court's failure to make factual findings in a proceeding where it 
must determine the validity of the obligation underlying the lien and under Rule 52(a) 
Ut.R.Civ.P. weigh the evidence to determine that validity, renders its decision erroneous, 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Ut.App. 1991). This is especially so where the 
proceeding below invoked the equitable powers of the court, the Wrongful Lien Act in effect 
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providing a scheme for statutory injunctive relief or reformation, cf. Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1243 (Utah 1980). 
B. The Court below refused to consider dispositive uncontroverted facts 
1. Because the court below dealt only with issues of law flowing from one fact (the 
Andersons' signature on the trust deed to Wilshire), at both the May 8,2002 and the July 17, 
2002 hearing the court opined that the Andersons claims under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) 
would have to be dealt with by a full trial on the merits of the claims arising under that 
subsection of the^c/.(R.469 p. 36; R.470 p. 9) The court's single finding of fact, resulting 
from the Andersons' admission in their affidavit that they signed the trust deed, could only 
support conclusions of law construing in isolation Subsection §38-9-l(6)(c) of the Wrongful 
Lien Act. However, by quashing the Andersons' cause of action under Utah Code Ann. §3 8-
9-4(3), the court disposed of their entire wrongful lien claim. 
2. Initially, the court framed its concerns about summary disposition in terms of lack 
of discovery (R.469 @ 25, R.469 @ 36; R.470 @ 9). The court noted a number of times that 
a summary disposition proceeding did not provide opportunity for discovery and that the 
facts presented by this case were simply too complex (despite the fact that Appellants key 
averments were undisputed) to be resolved without further discovery. 
3. Although in both hearings the court adopted an insular construction of Section 38-
9-1(6) of the Act to define "wrongful lien" without reference to external statutes, it did 
recognize that Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) (b) & (c) set up causes of action that the 
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Andersons could prosecute, not by way of summary disposition, but by way of discovery and 
trial(R.470@9,R.470@46). 
4. Thus, before the Court on this appeal is an order from the court below which 
contains only one finding of fact and that finding does not support its conclusion of law that 
the trust deed was not a wrongful lien. The other finding of fact in that final order, that the 
trust deed was expressly authorized by Utah Statute, is more properly cast as a conclusion 
of law {cf Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, FN6). Contrary to the holding in the Young 
decision and despite the Andersons' specific objection (R.292-298; 273-277), the court 
below entirely failed to deal with the issues raised by Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4 and §57-1-
19(3). Uncontroverted evidence proving that the trust deed was mis-delivered and was 
taken without promised consideration being given, exposes the complete lack of factual 
foundation for the court's conclusion the trust deed was expressly authorized by Utah law. 
5. The submission of evidence by affidavit evidence and the Andersons admission 
of the court's single finding of fact removes the need to marshal the evidence supporting that 
finding {cf Woodward @ 478). This Court is fully competent to decide issues of statutory 
construction, granting no deference to the court below. See Russell Tf8. As the analysis in 
part VIII.A. above makes clear, the court erred in its statutory construction of the Wrongful 
Lien Act, that error is dispositive of this appeal and proper construction of the Act entitles 
Appellants to nullification of the Wilshire lien. 
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C. Appellants are entitled to a judgment of wrongful lien as a matter of law 
i. The Andersons' evidence is undisputed 
1. At the summary disposition hearing, the Andersons' evidence of wrongful lien was 
undisputed on all essential averments. Whether on those facts they made out a prima facie 
case requiring the trial court to make a finding of wrongful lien, is a question of law which 
this Court will review for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's judgment. 
See Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, ^[13. 
2. Because Wilshire failed to present evidence rebutting the Andersons' factual 
averments that are dispositive of their claims of wrongful lien, the rule in Girardv. Appleby, 
660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1982) overruled on other grounds by MeadowBrook, L.L.C. v. 
Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998), results in Wilshire's waiver of any such defense. 
3. In paragraph 12 of his affidavit R. Michael Anderson avers that on August 16, 
2001 he had a telephone conversation with Marc S. Jenson and David G. Turcotte. (R.439) 
Details of that conversation are also recited in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Facts above. 
Marc S. Jenson as an inducement to the Andersons to allow the recording of the trust deed 
on their 61 acres of land, affirmatively represented to R. Michael Anderson that Wilshire 
would fund the Springs purchase of both the Hulet and the Johnson properties. Later that 
conversation was confirmed to Mr. Anderson by a letter from David Turcotte dated August 
16,2001(R.398). 
4. In response, on May 6, 2002 Marc S. Jenson swore an affidavit on behalf of 
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Wilshire, which in paragraph 11 and 12, replies to Mr. Anderson's averments (R. 145). Mr. 
Jenson disputes only one averment by Mr. Anderson. Mr. Jenson denies that he told Mr. 
Anderson that Wilshire would not foreclose. However, Mr. Jenson does not deny that he told 
Mr. Anderson that Wilshire would fund the purchase of both the Hulet and Johnson 
properties and in fact, at paragraphs 5 and 6 of his affidavit, Mr. Jenson admits that the 
purchase of both the Hulet and the Johnson properties was a requirement for Wilshire to 
provide financing. (R.147) 
5. In the result, Mr. Anderson's averment that Wilshire represented to him that it 
would provide funding for the purchase of both the Hulet and Johnson properties, is 
undisputed, as are Mr. Anderson's averments regarding the reasons for the purchase of the 
Hulet property. (R.439-440) 
6. Even more damning is the admission in paragraph 20 of the Jenson affidavit, that 
Wilshire breached its obligation to provide the $1.5 million for the purchase of the Hulet 
properties because of mere suspicion that the Springs was not dealing in good faith. (R. 143) 
The bona fides of that suspicion is rebutted by Mr. Jenson's own averments in paragraphs 
21 and 22 (R.142). There Wilshire admits that although the Springs had been in default for 
over seven months, Wilshire had taken no steps against the Springs to enforce its security 
interests. 
7. The most glaring omission from Mr. Jenson's affidavit is any credible evidence 
rebutting the Andersons' evidence that Wilshire secretly released Security Title as escrow 
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agent for the closing on the Hulet properties, and then secretly reversed its closing 
instructions to Security Title. Mr. Jenson attempts to deal with this issue at paragraphs 15 
and 16 of his affidavit. (R. 144). Yet this part of Mr. Jenson's affidavit contains nothing more 
than erroneous legal conclusion and irrelevant recitation of dealings with the Springs. 
8. Analysis of the actual closing instructions (R.431; R. 449) confirms that it was not 
until August 29, 2001 that Wilshire (without notice to the Andersons) gave instructions to 
release $2.05 million of the funds into the Utah closing, even though the $ 1.5 million for the 
Idaho closing was not being advanced. 
9. In response, Wilshire makes the baseless legal conclusion in paragraph 16 of the 
Jenson affidavit, that the terms of the trust deed preclude any claim for Wilshire's failure to 
fund the Hulet purchase. Yet without valid delivery of that trust deed, see Wiggillv. Cheney, 
597 P.2d 1351, 1352 (Utah 1979), those terms cannot operate. Furthermore, the ambiguous 
language in the trust deed relied upon by Wilshire, "regardless of whether Beneficiary 
obtains collateral or any guaranties from others or takes any other action contemplated 
by Trustor or Borrower", says nothing about Wilshire's obligation to advance the principal 
balance secured by the trust deed note. (R.444, ex. B) 
10. So far as the Andersons were aware Wilshire was not to obtain any collateral or 
guaranties from others, but was merely to advance funds to the Springs so it could obtain 
collateral. (R.439) Similarly, the phrase "... any other action contemplated by Trustor or 
Borrower...", is at best ambiguous, but must refer to action other than Wilshire funding the 
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$4,953 million loan, otherwise there is no obligation to secure and the trust deed is illusory. 
As to the merger doctrine, Spears @ ^ f 13 makes clear that the merger doctrine operates for 
the benefit of the seller (i.e. the Appellants). Any assertion by Wilshire, as the buyer (and 
especially where it is not a bona fide purchaser - see the cases cited at %[ 5 of Spears), of the 
merger doctrine is inapt. 
11. Wilshire's wrongful conduct in obtaining delivery of the trust deed puts this case 
on the same footing as the grantors of a deed in Gold Oil @ 713. There the court set aside 
a conveyance that occurred without valid delivery of the deed and without full consideration 
being given for the property. 
12. Even more incriminating is Wilshire's omission of Mr. Jenson's admission that 
Wilshire purposely refused to provide the $1.5 million for the Hulet purchase, from the 
materials it presented to this Court on Wilshire's motion for summary disposition. (R.143). 
13. Furthermore, prior to the July 17,2002 hearing, the Andersons subpoenaed into 
court the records referred to in Mr. Jenson's affidavit. (R.262-267) Wilshire refused to 
comply. A party failing to testify or produce evidence creates an inference that the evidence, 
if produced, would be unfavorable to that party. This is the rule relied upon in Gerard v. 
Young, 432 P.2d 343,346 (Utah 1967) where the Court cites McCormick on Evidence, page 
163, section 80: "Under familiar principles an unfavorable inference may be made against 
a party not only for destroying evidence, but for the mere failure to produce witnesses or 
documents within his control" cf State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Utah 1985). 
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In summary, the Andersons presented to the trial court undisputed evidence that: 
Wilshire induced the Andersons to execute the trust deed by representing to the 
Andersons that it would fund the Springs purchase of both the Johnson and 
Hulet properties; 
The Andersons delivered that trust deed to Wilshire's escrow agent on the 
strength of those representations. See New West Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 818 P.2d 585, 589 (Ut.App. 
1991) for authority that Security Title Company in Provo acted as Wilshire's 
escrow agent in its trust deed transaction with the Andersons; 
Wilshire through its August 22, 2001 closing instructions then represented to 
the Andersons, through its escrow agent, that although recordation of the 
documents in the Utah closing would proceed independent of the Idaho 
closing, none of the $2,365 million deposited with Wilshire's escrow agent 
would be released for use in Utah unless and until Wilshire provided the $ 1.5 
million to fund the Springs' closing on its purchase of the Hulet property in 
Idaho; 
The Andersons relying upon those closing instructions, released their trust 
deed to Wilshire's escrow agent for recording on the Andersons 61 acres in 
Utah; 
Wilshire on August 29, 2001, without any notice to the Andersons, reversed 
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its August 22,2001 closing instructions and instead instructed its escrow agent 
to record the Andersons trust deed and release $2.05 million of the funds to be 
applied to the Utah closing. 
15. By this subterfuge, Wilshire was able to get the Andersons' trust deed recorded 
without providing the $1.5 million for the purchase of the Hulet property. Wilshire's 
conversion of the Andersons' trust deed deprived them of $9.4 million cross-collateralization 
security on the Hulet properties and deprived the Springs of the collateral with which to 
obtain construction financing. Without those funds the Springs could not pay off the 
Wilshire trust deed and remove it from the Andersons 61 acres. Nor could the Springs 
purchase the Andersons' property for $9.4 million. Instead, that property was foreclosed 
upon and the Andersons lost their $5 million in equity in that property. 
ii. At the time its lien was recorded Wilshire knew its lien was wrongful 
1. All that Section 38-9-4(3) of the Act requires for its provisions to operate is that 
at the time of the trust deed's recording Wilshire have knowledge that the amount of the trust 
deed was materially misstated (in this case by some $2.5 million) or asserted a false claim 
(Wilshire already knew that it would not be advancing the $1.5 million). No other cause of 
action, independent of Section 38-9-4(3)(c) of the Act, must be proven. If Wilshire had 
knowledge of those facts that cause of action is proven. Undisputed evidence proves that at 
the time Wilshire instructed its escrow agent to record the trust deed on the Andersons 61 
acres, Wilshire knew: 
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i. It was not going to provide the additional $1.5 million to fund the purchase of 
the Hulet properties (R.143). The Andersons had never waived this 
requirement (R.329); or 
ii. It should have known that the Andersons did not know about Wilshires release 
of Security Title as its agent on the Idaho closing and knew or should have 
known that the Andersons were unaware of the reversal of its recording 
instructions. (R.331). 
2. See the analysis of imputation of an agent's knowledge to a principal in part II. of 
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Tracy Cannon, 2002 UT 99, for authority that Security 
Title's knowledge of these facts must be imputed to the Wilshire. Apart from any such 
imputation, Wilshire's failure to controvert the Andersons' evidence that they were not 
informed of these matters also establishes this knowledge (Girard @ 247; Smith @ 1057). 
3. The single fact that on April 16, 2002 Wilshire specifically represented to the 
Andersons it would be funding the purchase of both the Hulet and Johnson properties for the 
express purpose of having the Andersons rely on that statement also proves knowledge. 
Wilshire never took any steps to disabuse the Andersons of this belief. Any one of these 
three separate grounds prove, prima facie, that at the time Wilshire instructed the recording 
of the trust deed on the Andersons' 61 acres, it had the knowledge required by Utah Code 
Ann. §3 8-9-4(3)(c)5, that the document contained a false claim or material misstatement or 
5At the summary disposition hearing the Andersons argued this provision not 
because they sought damages but because this sub-paragraph dearly showed that the 
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both. Proof of either one of these claims is sufficient to find Wilshire's lien groundless. 
iii. When informed its' lien was wrongful Wilshire would not remove its 
lien 
1. From another perspective, regardless of Wilshire's bad faith, the wrongful lien 
definition in Section §38-9-l(6)(a) of the Act was also satisfied by the Andersons. 
Assuming arguendo, that Wilshire at the time of the escrow transaction was ignorant of the 
wrongful recording of the trust deed, once Wilshire knew that: 
i. The Andersons had never been timely informed of Wilshire's decision not to 
provide the $1.5 million for the purchase of the Hulet properties; or 
ii. that the trust deed had been recorded contrary to the Andersons instructions; 
Wilshire then became aware that the presumption under Utah Code Ann. §57-4a-4(d) had 
been rebutted and the trust deed recorded improperly. Note that unlike §38-9-4(3), §38-9-
l(6)(a) of the Utah Code Ann is an objective standard that contains no knowledge 
requirement. As soon as a lien claimant is served with notice that §38-9-1(6) of the Act was 
violated, it has 20 days to remove its lien. 
2. In this case, the Andersons petition for wrongful lien and supporting affidavit 
provided Wilshire with the notice required under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(2). Even though 
Wilshire was made fully aware of the facts showing it had no authority to record the trust 
deed - facts which it failed to controvert at the summary disposition hearing, it ignored 
definition of wrongful lien in Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1-6 required the court to find the trust 
deed wrongful lien if a material misstatement or false claim was proven 
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Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(2) and insisted upon maintaining its lien on the Andersons' land. 
3. It was plain error for the court below not to so rule, cf. State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 
P.2d 30, 37 (Ut.App. 1996). This error was the direct result of the trial court refusing to 
consider any of the uncontroverted evidence presented by the Appellants. The need for such 
findings was repeatedly drawn to the court's attention (R.470 @ 34, R.470@ 35; R.293; 
R.276). At trial the court responded to these objections by stating it was dismissing only a 
"portion" of the petition (R.470 @ 51) and that it was not disposing of the Andersons' claims 
under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). Yet it then proceeded to dispose of the entire wrongful 
lien claim. 
4. Despite the great prejudice to the Andersons resulting from the discrepancy 
between the court's verbal ruling and the proposed written order being drawn to its attention, 
the court signed the written order. By intentionally ruling contrary to uncontroverted facts 
presented by the Appellants, giving rise to the claim explicated in part VIILC.i. above, plain 
error should have been obvious to the court. 
5. Under either of the theories argued in part VIILC.i. or part VHI.C.ii above, at the 
summary disposition hearing the Andersons made out a prima facie case for wrongful lien 
that was uncontroverted. They were and are entitled to judgment on that basis. 
iv. A Wrongful Lien proceeding is equitable and equity can provide relief 
1. Another ground for removal of the wrongful lien was established at the summary 
disposition hearing. Applying the rule in the Gold Oil and Wiggill cases to the 
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uncontroverted facts of this case requires that equity be used to rescind the mis-delivered 
deed or that the signatures of the party's to it be stricken and the recording of the deed 
canceled. Wilshire argues that the prohibition in Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(4) against the 
court's determining, "...any other property or legal rights or the parties...", denies the court 
jurisdiction to exercise its equitable powers to this end6. 
2. Such argument ignores the fact that Appellants' evidence on such issues was 
uncontroverted7. Having failed to controvert Appellants' averments (or having admitted 
facts) disposing of key issues, Wilshire has rendered the question of "other property or legal 
rights of the parties", irrelevant. Only if Wilshire asserted that determination of other legal 
rights was a necessary predicate to a finding of wrongful lien and then proffered facts 
supporting that claim, could the the determination of "other... legal rights" come into issue. 
Admission of the facts disposing of those rights relieves the court from the need to 
determine those other legal rights. Cf. Dupler v. Yates, 3 51 P.2d 624,629 (Utah 1960) citing 
6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d.Ed.), p. 2006 for the proposition that: 
"The primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce 
allegations of the pleadings} to show that there is no genuine issue of fact, 
although an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and to establish that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
3. Proper delivery of a trust deed is a predicate to its valid recording. Rebuttal by 
6Also relevant to this issue is the argument made in 1J21 of Part VIII.A above that 
wrongful lien proceedings are inherently equitable. 
Paragraph 9 in part VIII.A above also disposes of Wilshire's argument. 
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uncontroverted evidence of the presumption of valid delivery stated in Utah Code Ann. §57-
4a-4(d) is simply one of many possible legal grounds under which one may show that a lien 
is groundless or asserts a false claim. Once it was shown Wilshire was not entitled to the 
presumptions in this statute, the court's equitable powers could be used to remove the 
Wilshire lien as wrongful. 
4. In that case, Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984), where the Court 
canceled a mis-delivered quitclaim deed, noting at page 105 that, "an action to avoid a deed 
is one in equity", and at page 106 that, "delivery or its absence is a question ojfacf\ 
becomes relevant. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989), where a bank 
negligently endorsed a note for $132,000 00 for which it received no value, is also 
authoritative. At page 5 of that decision the Court quoted Corbin on Contracts, §610 at 692 
(1960) for the rule: 
"There is practically universal agreement that, if the material mistake of one 
party was caused by the other, either purposely or innocently, or was known 
to him, or was of such character and accompanied by such circumstances that 
he had reason to know of it the mistaken party has a right to rescission. " 
5. Given Wilshire's expansive admissions regarding the August 16, 2001 
conversation with Mr Anderson, its' admission that it represented to the Andersons that 
Wilshire would fund the purchase of the Hulet and Johnson properties, its' admission that 
this representation was given in exchange for the Andersons signature on the trust deed and 
its delivery to Wilshire's escrow agent, privity has been proven. This provides grounds for 
applying the rule stated at page 6 by the Court in Guardian that, "a mistake in the 
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recordation or memorialization of an agreement or document may not be exploited by one 
party to take advantage of the other. " 
6. On the same principle, rules established under other theories of recovery were 
applicable to the Andersons' wrongful lien claims. For example, regardless of the question 
of privity, Culp Constr. Co. v. Builders Mall, 795 P.2d 650,659 (Utah 1990) establishes that 
when a first party to a real estate transaction knows that a third party to that same transaction 
will rely upon representations made by the first party that are not true, the first party is liable 
for negligent misrepresentation. One does not have to be in privity to establish a claim for 
negligent misrepresentation. Applying Culp to the facts of this case proves negligent 
misrepresentation by Wilshire caused delivery of the trust deed for recording and so violated 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). 
7. For the same reason , a claim for fraudulent concealment under the holding in 
Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802, 804 (Utah 1963) also become relevant, as does the use of 
undisputed facts to show the elements of fraud delineated in Schuhman v. Green River Motel, 
835 P.2d 992 (Ut. App. 1992). Proof of any one of these causes of action invalidates the 
delivery of the trust deed to Wilshire's escrow agent for recording. 
8. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), presents a 
case where signers to promissory notes guaranteeing the obligation of their milk cooperative 
to the bank, were induced to sign those notes by representations from the bank that the notes 
would never be enforced. As in the Gold Oil, Horton and Wiggill cases, the Court in 
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Berkeley upheld the cancellation of the signatures on the instrument in question. Once the 
circumstances of the execution and recording of the trust deed are proven, the fact that at the 
time of its recording the Wilshire lien was not authorized by Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3) is 
established {see §38-9-l(6)(a) ofihtAct). 
9. As the above argument demonstrates, not only does the Andersons' case present 
substantial grounds for appeal, as a matter of law they are entitled to a judgment that the trust 
deed in question was a wrongful lien. 
v. If remanded, the Court should discuss matters relevant on remand 
10. Should this Court instead remand this case back to the court below for 
adjudication of the Andersons' wrongful lien claim according to the construction of the 
Wrongful Lien Act adopted by this Court, Appellants respectfully request that the Court 
exercise its discretion to discuss, "...matters that may become material on remand. " See Bair 
@f22. If remanded for a new hearing, the central issue will be the effect that Wilshire's 
failure to contest essential averments in R. Michael Anderson's affidavit has on Wilshire's 
ability to assert defenses to Appellants wrongful lien claim. See Girard @ 247. 
D. An award of Attorney's fees to the Andersons is in order 
1. Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7(5) provides for an award of attorney's fees for wrongful 
lien. Undisputed evidence that Wilshire at the time of recording knew the trust deed 
contained a material misstatement and false claim entitles the Andersons to judgment as a 
matter of law. In that event, attorney's fees and costs to the Andersons should follow, both 
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at appeal and in the court below. 
2. Alternatively, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 provides for attorney's fees where the 
opposing party's documents provides for an award of attorney's fees. The trust deed 
provided at paragraph 12 provides for attorney's fees to Wilshire in the event of default by 
the Andersons. Although the trust deed's improper recording prevents the operation of that 
provision against the Andersons, its' wrongful recording and Wilshire's refusing to remove 
it, estops Wilshire from asserting its own misconduct in that recording as a defense to that 
provision's application against them, Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 814P.2d 1125, 
1129 (Ut. App. 1991). See also Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 
(Utah 1985); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App. 1987) where the elements 
of estoppel (i.e. false representation or concealment of facts, made with real or constructive 
knowledge, to a party who is without knowledge of the real facts, with the intent that the 
false representation be acted upon, and reliance by that party to his prejudice) applicable to 
this issue are recited. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully request that this Court set aside the August 9,2002 judgment 
of the trial court, granting no deference to the trial court's construction of the Wrongful Lien 
Act, that the Court fully apply Sections 38-9-l(6)(a) and 38-9-4(3) of the Utah Code 
Annotated to the uncontroverted facts in evidence before the trial court and find that the trust 
deed filed by the Appellee Wilshire Investments, L.L.C. against the Appellant Andersons 
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61 acre property, was a wrongful lien and award the Appellants costs and attorney's fees in 
this proceeding and the proceeding below. 
DATED t h i s ^ b ^ day of May; 2003. 
IX. ADDENDUM 
A. Order entered August 9, 2002 
B. Correspondence between counsel regarding Andersons' Subpoena Duces Tecum 
C. The Wrongful Lien Act 
D. The Effects of Recording Act 
E. The Conveyances Act 
F. Bill Summary for The Wrongful Lien Act 
G. Notice of Default 
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Mark F. James (5295) 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-6363 
Facsimile: (801) 363-6666 
Attorneys for Wilshire Investments, LLC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. MICHAEL ANDERSON and ROBERT ) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AM) 
H.ANDERSON, ) ORDER DISMISSING PETITIONERS' 
) PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
Petitioners/Plaintiffs, ) WRONGFUL LIEN AND DENYING 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR 
vs. ) NEW TRIAL 
) 
WILSHIRE DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., ) Civil No. 020500229 
) 
) Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Respondent. ) 
) 
On Wednesday, May 8, 2002, the Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners' Petition 
seeking removal of a lien in the form of a Deed of Trust recorded in favoi of Wilshire 
Investments, LLC,' as beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, on property located in Wasatch County, 
Utah. Ronald Ady appeared as counsel for Petitioners. Mark F. James of the law firm of Hatch, 
James & Dodge and Eric Pearson of Argue, Pearson, Harbison and Myers appeared as counsel 
for Respondent. 
' Although the caption lefeiences "Wilshiie Development, L L.C.," the Couit was inl'oinietl at the May 8, 2002, 
l ieamu' on the Petition tli.il Re<jnnnrlent\ conect name IQ "Wild-me [nui.cin».K. i I i • -
On Wednesday, July 17, 2002, the Court conducted a hearing on Petitioners' Objections 
to Proposed Form of Order relating to the May 8, 2002 hearing as well as on Petitioners' Motion 
for New Trial or for Reconsideration. At the July 17, 2002, hearing, Ronald Ady appeared as 
counsel for Petitioners, and Mark F. James of the law firm of Hatch, James & Dodge and Eric 
Pearson of Argue, Pearson, Harbison and Myers appeared as counsel for Respondent. 
The Court, having reviewed the file in this matter, including the memoranda and 
affidavits provided to the Court, and having considered the evidence before it and the arguments 
from respective counsel, good cause appearing, 
HEREBY FINDS, ORDERS AND DECREES as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The trust deed at issue in this matter that was recorded m the Wasatch County 
Recorder's Office and which Petitioners claim to be a wrongful lien (the "Trust Deed") is 
expressly authorized by Utah Statute. 
2. The Trust deed was signed by the owners of the real property to which the Trust 
Deed pertains. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Trust Deed does not constitute a wrongful lien as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §38-9-1(6). 
ORDER 
1. That portion of Petitioners' Petition that asserts a wrongful lien under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 38-9-1, et seq. is hereby dismissed; 
2. Petitioners' Motion for a New Trial and/or to Reconsider filed in connection with 
the Court's ruling at the conclusion of the May 8, 2002 hearing in this matter is denied. The 
Court reaffirms its prior rulings in this matter; 
3. Respondent's request for an award of costs and attorney's fees is denied at this 
time. The request is reserved for consideration by the Court at a later date should this case 
continue; 
Petitioners are granted leave to amend their Petition to correct the name Wilshire 
to Wilshire Investments, LLC, rather than Wilshire Developments; and 
5. A legal description of the real property at issue, which is located in Wasatch 
County, State of Utah, is as follows: 
Commencing at the North l/4 Comer of Section 27, Township 3 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 00 degrees 27' 01" East 1348.29 
feet; thence West 766.89 feet; thence South 396.00 feet; thence West 594.06 feet; 
thence North 12 degrees 24' 36" West 55.01 feet; thence North 00 degrees 00' 
00" East 324.50 feet; thence South 89 degrees 12' 00" East 50.69 feet; thence 
North 01 degrees 00' 00" East 330.00 feet; thence North 89 degrees 12' 00" West 
664.77 feet; thence North 00 degrees 30' 42" East 974.77 feet; thence North 52 
degrees 54' 34" East 71.27 feet; thence north 89 degrees 42' 53" East 1904.86 
feet to the point of beginning. 
an 
DATED this / day of 
E COURT: 
Hoiiprahle-Beailsl J. Eyre 
Fourm District Court Judge 
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LAW OFFICES 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
lO WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 101 
TELEPHONE (801)363-6363 




lOWest 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Anderson, et ai vs. Wilshire Investments, LLC- Petition for Removal of 
Wrongful Lien 
Dear Ron: 
I received by hand-delivery your letter to me dated July 9, 2002, which enclosed a 
subpoena duces tecum addressed to Wilshire Investments, L.L.C.. Unfortunately, the letter 
arrived late in the afternoon, shortly before I was required to leave my office, and 1 was out-of-
town the remainder of the week. Marc Jenson, manager of Wilshire Investments, LLC 
("Wilshire"), is out-of-town this week, and therefore I have not spoken with Mr. Jenson about the 
subpoena duces tecum delivered to my office. 
On behalf of Wilshire, 1 make the following objections to the subpoena: 
1. Service of a subpoena on me or my office does not constitute service of process 
on my client, absent my agreement to accept service on behalf of my client. You have not asked 
that 1 accept service of the subpoena, nor did I agree to accept service. 
2. The subpoena was delivered to my office on July 9, 2002, less than 14 days prior 
to the purported date and time of production (July 17 at 10:00 a.m.). As set forth in the "Notice 
to persons Arranging to Service a Subpoena" attached to the purported subpoena, a person or 
entity to whom the subpoena is directed has the right to object if the subpoena "does not allow 
you at least 14 days to comply, unless the party service the subpoena has obtained a court order 
requiring an earlier response." No such order has been obtained to my knowledge. 
3. The subpoena improperly purports to require my client, who resides in Salt Lake 
County, to produce documents in Wasatch County. 
4. The Court dismissed your clients' petition for wrongful lien, [f your clients desire 
to conduct discovery against my client, such discovery must be conducted in compliance with 
the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure. The purported attempt to engage in discovery through 
the subpoena does not comport with the anolicahle mle^ 




5. The subpoena is overbroad and seeks production of documents lhat are irrelevant, 
including, without limitation, requests A and C. 
For the foregoing reasons, my client objects to the purported subpoena that was sent to 
my office and will not be producing documents in response to the subpoena. 
Very truly yours, 
Mark F. James // 
cc. Mr. Marc S. Jenson 
Eric Pearson, Esq. 
R O N A L D A D Y 
A T T O R N E Y A T L A W 
July 16,2002 
Mark F. James 
Hatch James & Dodge 
Attorneys at Law 
10W. Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 
Re: Andersons v. Wilsliire Investments 
Dear Mr. James: 
Neither Rule 45 or its advisory committee notes indicate that a subpoena cannot be served upon a 
party. Numerous cases have held that a subpoena can be served on a party and the text of the Rule, 
by continually imposing specific requirements for service upon or setting up exceptions for non-
parties, makes clear that parties are subject to its terms. 
The relief provided for in a summary disposition proceeding is injunctive type relief (i.e. an order 
providing for a mandatory injunction requiring the removal of a lien from real property). Thus, such 
a proceeding falls within the exemption in Rule 26(2)(A)(iii). Note that U.C.A. 38-9-6(4) 
specifically recognizes the nature of a summary disposition proceeding, when it explicitly allows 
pursuit of other injunctive relief notwithstanding a Court's summary disposition determination. 
Furthermore, Rule 26(d) and 26(f), by their own terms, cannot apply to a summary disposition 
proceeding. It is self evident that the Rule 26 discovery timelines cannot operate within the time 
allowed by U.C.A. 38-9-1 et seq. We appear tomorrow at the re-hearing of such a truncated 
proceeding. It is only because of the Rule 26 timelines imposed upon parties that Rule 45(b)(4) 
excepts only subpoenas served on non-parties from the discovery timelines imposed by Rule 26 
(hence the "otherwise provided for by these Rules" exception in Rule 26(d)). Thus, only in cases 
where Rule 26(d) can operate do your contentions have any substance. 
With respect, your refusal to properly brief coupled with the invective you needlessly and flagrantly 
injected into your memoranda will, regardless of the Court's determination of the ultimate merits 
of this case, expose your client to attorney's fees sanctions. 
ONALDADY 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel (801) 539-1900 • Telecopier (801) 322-1054 • E-mail: r80barr@msn.com 
LAW OFFICES 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
A. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
10 W E S T BROADWAY, S U I T E 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
T E L E P H O N E (801 )363 -6363 
FAX (801) 363-6666 
July 16, 2002 
Via Facsimile (322-1054) 
Ronald Ady 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Anderson, et al vs. Wilshire Investments, LLC - Petition for Removal of 
Wrongful Lien 
Dear Ron: 
I received your undated letter faxed to me earlier today a short time ago. Although I disagree with 
virtually every assertion contained in your letter, I will simply note as follows. Although you state that Rule 
45(b)(4) and 45(c)(2)(A) "make it clear that the 14 day requirement applies only to non-parties," Rule 45 and 
the advisory comments thereto indicate that subpoenas in general relate to non-parties - not to parties. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(6), which provides the specific methods to discover additional matters from parties, 
does not include subpoenas as an identified method. Moreover, Rule 26(d) specifically provides, except with 
respect to certain specific exceptions not applicable here, "a party may not seek discovery from any source 
before the parties have met and conferred as required by Subdivision (f). As you know, no meet and confer has 
occurred in this case - nor would such meeting be appropriate in light of the Couifs ruling dismissing your 
clients1 Petition. In addition to the objectionable nature of your subpoena for the reasons set forth in ray prior 
letter to you, your subpoena constitutes a clear and abusive attempt to circumvent the requirements of Rule 26 
as well as those set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 34, which provides the specific method for one party 
to a lawsuit to acquire documents from another party to the lawsuit. 
While I appreciate your efforts to instruct me regarding what you believe I should advise my client, I 
consider myself fully capable of providing that advice which I believe appropriate. My client has incurred 
significant costs and attorneys fees responding to your baseless allegations and meritless arguments asserted in 
this matter, including misrepresentations to the Court regarding the plain meaning of Utah's Wrongful Lien 
Statute, the legislative history of that statute, and regarding Utah case law. 1 anticipate addressing these issues 
with the Court at tomorrow's hearing. 
cc. Mr. Marc S. Jenson 
Eric Pearson, Esq. 
R O N A L D A D Y 
A T T O R N E Y A T L A W 
Mark F. James 
Hatch James & Dodge 
Attorneys at Law 
10 W. Broadway 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 
Re: Andersons v. Wilshire Investments 
Dear Mr. James: 
I am in receipt of your letter specifying the objections to my clients' subpoena. That letter was hand-
delivered to my office about an hour ago. 
Enclosed for service upon you is our affidavit of service for the above referenced subpoena. Your 
client, a party to the action, was provided with a full week to comply with this subpoena. Everything 
we have requested relates to Mr. Jenson's affidavit already filed in this action. If he has acted with 
due diligence, he should have already reviewed these documents before swearing his earlier 
affidavit. We have plowed no new ground with this subpoena. 
You advise that you left on vacation the day following service of the subpoena on you. Is it not the 
case that there are secretaries or paralegals in your office that could have timely forwarded this 
subpoena to Wilshire? There is no reason that the only timely action then required of your office 
in regard to this subpoena — the immediate forwarding of the subpoena to Wilshire -- could not have 
been done in your absence. Upon your return, Wilshire would have assembled all of the documents 
requested and it would only remain for you to deal with the issue of determining whether there was 
a proper objection to the subpoena. The fact that proper instmctions were not left with your staff 
for action on pressing litigation matters that had to be dealt with in your absence, should not 
prejudice my clients. 
Dealing with the objections stated in your letter of today's date in order, I can advise: 
1. Rule 5(b)(1) Ut. R. Civ.P. requires that we serve your office with the subpoena. In 
conjunction with Rule 4(e)(5), it qualifies your office as an agent for service of the subpoena. 
U.C.A. 48-2b-l 13 provides for service in this manner. Service upon your office was valid; 
2. Rule 45(b)(4) & 45(c)(2)(A) make it clear that the 14 day requirement applies only to non-
parties. Your client is a party to this action and in that case only a "reasonable" time is 
required; 
3. Your client is a resident of this State and so Rule 45(c)(3)(B)(iii) controls. As a party to the 
action your client is required to produce documents in Wasatch County. In any event, we 
offered to accept production in Salt Lake County; 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tel. (801) 539-1900 • Telecopier (801) 322-1054 • E-mail: r80barr@msn.com 
Ady lo James 
July 16, 2002 
- ? -
4. This is a motion for new trial and all matters previously before the Court are still in issue. 
Also, no order was entered on the Court's alleged dismissal of this action and until that order 
is entered, my clients' action against your client survives and may be proceeded upon; 
5. Without prejudice to my clients' claims for production of documents under parts A and C 
of the subpoena, I urge you to produce forthwith the documents requested in parts B and D 
of the subpoena. As to parts A and C of the subpoena, part C merely requests production of 
documents for those matters specifically averred to in Mr. Jenson's affidavit. Having put 
these matters into issue and having relied upon them for your client's benefit, it is not open 
to you to now argue that they are irrelevant. As to Part A, Wilshire was organized and 
registered in the State in late July 2001. We have limited our request to the 40 days 
subsequent to that date of registration. Whether Wilshire had the ability to fund the purchase 
of the Hulet property on August 21,2001 when it gave its first set of closing instructions to 
Security Title, whether on August 28, 2001, when Wilshire unilaterally and without notice 
to the Andersons changed those instructions, had those funds and whether on September 6, 
2001 it had those funds (when Wilshire gave another set of closing instrucitons to Security 
Title), is highly relevant and very material to my clients' claims against your client in this 
action. As I am sure you are aware, your client's claims do not control the scope of 
discovery. 
Accordingly, your objection are without merit and you should advise your client it must forthwith 
comply with the subpoena. 
TabC 
38-8-4 LIENS 
38-8-4. Posting of notice. 
Each owner acting under this chapter shall keep posted in a prominent place 
in his office at all times a notice which reads as follows: 
"All articles stored by a rental agreement, and charges not having been 
paid for 30 days, will be sold or otherwise disposed of to pay charges." 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-4, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 171, § 4. 
38-8r5. Other liens unaffected. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as in any manner impairing or 
affecting the right of parties to create liens by special contract or agreement, 
nor shall it in any manner affect or impair other liens arising at common law 
or in equity, or by any statute of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 38-8-5, enacted by L. 




38-9-1. Definitions. 38-9-6. Petition to file lien — Notice to 
38-9-2. Scope. record interest holders — Sum-
38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful mary relief — Contested petition, 
lien within scope of employment— 38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to 
Good faith requirement. i i e n claimant — Summary relief— 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien Finding of wrongful lien — Wrong-
— Damages. ful nen i s vo^ 
38-9-5. Criminal liability for filing a wrong-
ful lien — Penalties. 
38-9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder'5 means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title 
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property 
who offers a document for recording or filing with any county recorder in 
the state asserting a lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner* means a person who has a vested ownership interest in 
certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a 
present, lawful property interest in certain real property, including an 
owner, titleholder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose 
name and interest in that real property appears in the county recorder's 
records for the county in which the property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership inter-
est in certain real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's 
records for the countv in which thp nrnno-rfv 4o i^ ^«+^^ 
WRONGFUL LIEN 38-9-3 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the 
time it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal 
statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-1, enacted by L. 
1997, ch. 125, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1997, ch. 125, § 2, repeals former § 38-9-1, as 
enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 1, relating to 
the liability of a person filing a wrongful lien, 
and enacts the present section. See §§ 38-9-4 
and 38-9-5 for present liability provisions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Wrongful lien. 
A notice of termination of restrictive cov-
enants recorded in the office of the county 
recorder was not a wrongful lien. Swenson v. 
Erickson, 2000 UT 16, 998 P.2d 807. 
Plaintiffs were entitled to summary relief 
where the parties' sales agreement did not 
convey defendants an interest in property, but 
only a qualified promise to do so at a later time, 
and therefore defendants'notice of interest was 
a wrongful lien as defined in this section. 
Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 
1244. 
38-9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1, 38-9-3, 38-9-4, 38-9-5, and 38-9-6 
apply to any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien 
pursuant to this chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of 
record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-2, enacted by L. 
1997, ch. 125, § 3; 1999, ch. 122, § 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1997, ch. 125, § 3 repeals former § 38-9-2, as 
enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 2, relating to 
an unauthorized lien as invalid, and enacts the 
present section. For present comparable provi-
sion, see § 38-9-7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment, effective May 3,1999, added the Subsec-
tion (lXa) designation; substituted the list of 
sections in Subsection (lXa) for "this chapter"; 
added Subsection (1Kb); and added "Mechanics' 
Liens" in Subsection (3). 
38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within 
scope of employment — Good faith requirement. 
(1) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder 
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1. If the county 
recorder rejects the document, the county recorder shall immediately return 
the original document together with a notice that the document was rejected 
38^4 LIENS 
pursuant to this section to the person attempting to record or file the document 
or to the address provided on the document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the county recorder's 
employment, rejects or accepts a document for recording or filing in good faith 
under this section may not be liable for damages except as otherwise provided 
by law. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court 
order, it shall have no retroactive recording priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any 
remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-3, enacted by L. containing a wrongful lien, and enacts the 
1997, ch. 125, § 4. present section. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1997, ch. 125, § 4 repeals former § 38-9-3, as meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 3, relating to County recorder, powers and duties, § 17-
liability for refusing to correct a document 21-1 et seq. 
38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien — Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder 
against real property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual 
damages proximately caused by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of this Subsection (1) refuses to release or 
correct the wrongful lien within 20 days from the date of written request from 
a record interest holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to 
the last-known address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, 
and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for 
treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees 
and costs, who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien 
as defined in~Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real 
property, knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1985, ch. 182, § 4, relating to 
1997, ch. 125, § 5. venue, costs, and attorney fees, and enacts the 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws present section. For present provisions, see § 
1997, ch. 125, § 5 repeals former § 38-9-4, as 38-9-6. 
38-9-5« Criminal liability for filing a wrongful lien — 
Penalties. 
(1) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with a county recorder is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Under this Subsection (1), it is an affirmative defense to this offense that the 
person recorded or filed a release of the claim or lien within 20 days from the 
date of written request from a record interest holder that the wrongful lien be 
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released. The accused person shall prove this affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(2) A person who intentionally records or files or causes to be recorded or 
filed a wrongful lien with the county recorder is guilty of a third degree felony 
if, at the time of recording or filing, the person knowingly had no present, 
lawful property interest in the real property and no reasonable basis to believe 
he had a present, lawful property interest in the real property. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall bar a prosecution for any act in violation of 
Section 76-8-414. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-5, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo 
1997, ch. 125, § 6- nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 125 Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
38-9-6. Petition to file lien — Notice to record interest 
holders — Summary relief— Contested petition. 
(1) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 38-9-3 
may petition the district court in the county in which the document was 
rejected for an expedited determination that the lien may be recorded or filed. 
(2) (a) The petition shall be filed with the district court within ten days of 
the date notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity 
the grounds why the document should lawfully be recorded or filed. 
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the lien 
claimant. 
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the 
petition without a hearing. 
(d) If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the 
petition, notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an 
expedited hearing on all record interest holders of the property sufficiently 
in advance of the hearing to enable any record interest holder to attend the 
hearing and service shall be accomplished by certified or registered mail. 
(e) Any record interest holder of the property has the right to attend 
and contest the petition. 
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document 
may lawfully be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder 
to accept the document for recording. If the petition is contested, the court may 
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether 
or not a contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county 
recorder. The proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the 
document nor the property or legal rights of the parties beyond the necessary 
determination of whether or not the document shall be recorded. The court's 
grant or denial of the petition under this section may not restrict any other 
legal remedies of any party, including any right to injunctive relief pursuant to 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, Injunctions. 
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings 
may not be expedited under this section. 
38-9-7 LIENS 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-6, enacted by L. became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
1997, ch. 125, § 7. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 125 
38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to lien claimant — 
Summary relief — Finding of wrongful lien — 
Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien 
as defined in Section 38-9-1 has been recorded may petition the district court 
in the county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify 
the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a 
wrongful lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest 
holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition 
without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a 
hearing within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful 
lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the 
lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 4, Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether 
or not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any 
other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of 
any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the 
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien, and 
awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the 
order with the county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall 
dismiss the petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to 
the lien claimant. The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of 
the real property. The prevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy 
of the dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of 
claim or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings 
may not be expedited under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-7, enacted by I* became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
1997, ch. 125, § 8. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 125 
TabD 
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(3) In the absence of a statement identifying which provision is to be 
incorporated as described in Subsection (2)(b)(iii), the entire referenced master 
form is considered incorporated. 
(4) A party may not incorporate by reference the legal description of the real 
property affected by the mortgage or trust deed being recorded. 
History: C. 1953, 57-3-203, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 61, § 12 
1998, ch. 61, § 10. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
57-3-204. Constructive notice — Effect as between direct 
parties to mortgage or t rust deed. 
(1) The recording of a mortgage or trust deed that incorporates a provision 
of a master form in accordance with Section 57-3-203, operates as constructive 
notice of the mortgage or trust deed, including all incorporated provisions of 
the referenced master form. 
(2) Nothing in this part modifies the law regarding the effectiveness of a 
mortgage, trust deed, or contract as between: 
(a) the mortgagor and mortgagee of the mortgage; or 
(b) the trustor, beneficiary, and trustee under a trust deed. 
History: C. 1953, 57-3-204, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 61, § 12 
1998, ch. 61, § 11. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
CHAPTER 4 
VALIDATING CERTAIN CONVEYANCES 
[REPEALED] 
57-4-1 to 57-4-4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals deeds executed before 1913, deeds of mayors or 
§§ 57-4-1 to 57-4-4, Utah Code Annotated probate or district judges acknowledged before 
1953, validating deeds of mayors and territorial recorders or clerks, and all instruments re-
probate judges under the Townsite Act, mayor's corded before 1943, effective July 1, 1988. 
CHAPTER 4a 
EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Section Section 
57-4a-l. Document recordable despite de- 57-4a-3. Document recordable without ac-
fects. knowledgment. 
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts no- 57-4a-4. Presumptions. 
tice of contents despite defects. 
57-4a-l. Document recordable despite defects. 
Each document executed and acknowledged on or before July 1, 1988, may 
EFFECTS OF RECORDING 57-4a-4 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-l, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 19. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and C.J.S. — 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser 
Recording Laws §§ 122 to 128. § 341. 
57-4a-2, Recorded document imparts notice of contents 
despite defects. 
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents regardless of any defect, 
irregularity, or omission in its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A 
certified copy of a recorded document is admissible as evidence to the same 
extent the original document would be admissible as evidence. 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-2, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 20. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect on existing documents. Section 68-3-3, prohibiting retroactive effect 
When this section took effect on July 1,1988, unless expressly declared, has no application to 
it operated to cure any existing defective re- the operation of this section. This section cured 
corded document. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 existing defective recorded documents when it 
Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992). took effect; it did not retroactively cure any 
This section does not say that a defective defective instruments. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 
document is valid only if recorded after July 1, 147 Bankr. 248 (D. Utah 1992) 
1988. First Sec. Bank v. Styler, 147 Bankr. 248 
(D. Utah 1992). 
57-4a-3. Document recordable without acknowledgment. 
A document or a certified copy of a document may be recorded without 
acknowledgment if: 
(1) it was executed under law existing at the time of execution; 
(2) it evidences or affects title to real property; and 
(3) it was issued under the authority of: 
(a) the United States, another state, a court of record, a foreign 
government, or an Indian tribe; or 
(b) this state or any of its political subdivisions but, any document 
executed under the authority of this state or any of its political 
subdivisions after July 1,1988, may not be recorded unless it includes 
a certificate of acknowledgement or jurat. 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — "Acknowledgement* 
1988, ch. 155, § 21; 1989, ch. 88, § 10. and "jurat* defined, § 46-1-2. 
57-4a-4e Presumptions. 
(1) A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title 
to the real property affected: 
( a ) t h e d o c u m e n t IS crprmir»o <mA n r n n 
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(b) the person executing the document and the person on whose behalf 
it is executed are the persons they purport to be; 
(c) the person executing the document was neither incompetent nor a 
minor at any relevant time; 
(d) delivery occurred notwithstanding any lapse of time between dates 
on the document and the date of recording; 
(e) any necessary consideration was given; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or 
described by the document acted in good faith at all relevant times; 
(g) a person executing a document as an agent, attorney in fact, officer 
of an organization, or in a fiduciary or official capacity: 
(i) held the position he purported to hold and acted within the scope 
of his authority; 
(ii) in the case of an officer of an organization, was authorized 
under all applicable laws to act on behalf of the organization; and 
(iii) in the case of an agent, his agency was not revoked, and he 
acted for a principal who was neither incompetent nor a minor at any 
relevant time; 
(h) a person executing the document as an individual: 
(i) was unmarried on the effective date of the document; or 
(ii) if it otherwise appears from the document that the person was 
married on the effective date of the document, the grantee was a bona 
fide purchaser and the grantor received adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth so that the joinder of the 
nonexecuting spouse was not required under Sections 75-2-201 
through 75-2-207; 
(i) if the document purports to be executed pursuant to or to be a final 
determination in a judicial or administrative proceeding, or to be executed 
pursuant to a power of eminent domain, the court, official body, or 
condemnor acted within its jurisdiction and all steps required for the 
execution of the document were taken; and 
(j) recitals and other statements of fact in a document, including 
without limitation recitals concerning mergers or name changes of orga-
nizations, are true. 
(2) The presumptions stated in Subsection (1) arise even though the 
document purports only to release a claim or to convey any right, title, or 
interest of the person executing it or the person on whose behalf it is executed. 
History: C. 1953, 57-4a-4, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 22; 1989, ch. 88, § 11. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
deed has been executed and recorded may be 
overcome only by clear and convincing evidence 
that the deed was in fact not delivered. Jacobs 
v. Hafen, 875 R2d 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Evidence to overcome presumption. Cited in Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 
The presumption of valid delivery when a P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
ANALYSIS 








2a. Recognition of Acknowledgments. 
3. Recording of Documents. 
4. Validating Certain Conveyances [Repealed]. 
4a. Effects of Recording. 
5. Plats and Subdivisions [Repealed]. 
6. Occupying Claimants. 
7. Tbwnsites [Repealed]. 
8. Condominium Ownership Act. 
9. Marketable Record Title. 
10. Utah Coordinate System. 
11. Land Sales Practice. 
12. Relocation Assistance. 
13. Solar Easements. 
13a. Easement for Water Conveyance. 
14. Limitation of Landowner Liability — Public Recreation. 
15. Assumption of Indebtedness on Residential Real Property. 
16. Mobile Home Park Residency. 
17. Residential Renters' Deposits. 
18. Land Conservation Easement Act. 
19. Timeshare and Camp Resort Projects. 
20. Local Rent Control Prohibition. 
21. Fair Housing Act. 
22. Utah Fit Premises Act. 





57-1-2. Words of inheritance not re-
quired to pass fee. 
57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed. 
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more 
than grantor owns — Effect. 
57-1-5. Creation of joint tenancy pre-
sumed — Tenancy in com-
mon. 
57-1-5.1. Termination of an interest in 
real estate — Affidavit. 
57-1-6 to 57-1-9, Repealed. 
Section 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Ef-
fect. 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed — Ef-
fect. 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage — Effect. 
57-1-15. Effect of recording assignment 
of mortgage. 
57-1-16 to 57-1-18. Repealed. 
57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of 
terms. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real prop-
erty — Purnosps — F.ffip^ f 
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Section 
ment by beneficiary — Effect 
— Substitution of trustee — 
Recording — Form. 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power 
of trustee — Foreclosure of 
trust deed. 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee 
— Notice of default. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — De-
scription of property — Time 
and place of sale. 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of 
default and notice of sale — 
Mailing by trustee or benefi-
ciary — Publication of notice 
of default. 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public 
auction — Postponement of 
sale. 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee 
— Payment of bid — Trustee's 
deed delivered to purchaser 
— Recitals — Effect. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Dis-
position. 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee 
— Corporate stock evidencing 
water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in perfor-
mance of obligations secured 
— Reinstatement — Cancel-

















Sale of trust property by trustee 
— Action to recover balance 
due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as secu-
rity — Collection of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Repealed. 
Reconveyance of a trust deed. 
Sale of trust property by trustee 
— Foreclosure of trust deed 
— Limitation of actions. 
Trust deeds — Transfer of se-
cured debts as transfer of se-
curity. 
Trust deeds — Instruments en-
titled to be recorded — As-
signment of a beneficial inter-
est. 
Failure to disclose not a basis 
for liability. 
Release of security interest. 
Definitions. 
Reconveyance of trust deed or 
release of mortgage — Proce-
dures — Forms. 
Objections to reconveyance or 
release. 
Liability of title insurer or title 
agent. 
Application of provisions. 
Other sections not affected. 
57-1-1. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
(1) "Certified copy" means a copy of a document certified by its custo-
dian to be a true and correct copy of the document or the copy of the 
document maintained by the custodian, where the document or copy is 
maintained under the authority of the United States, the state of Utah or 
any of its political subdivisions, another state, a court of record, a foreign 
government, or an Indian tribe. 
(2) "Document" means every instrument in writing, including every 
conveyance, affecting, purporting to affect, describing, or otherwise con-
cerning any right, title, or interest in real property, except wills and leases 
for a term not exceeding one year. 
(3) "Real property" or "real estate" means any right, title, estate, or 
interest in land, including all nonextracted minerals located in, on, or 
under the land, all buildings, fixtures and improvements on the land, and 
all water rights, rights-of-way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, 
tenements, hereditaments, possessory rights, claims, including mining 
claims, privileges, and appurtenances belonging to, used, or enjoyed with 
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(4) "Stigmatized" means: 
(a) the site or suspected site of a homicide, other felony, or suicide; 
or 
(b) the dwelling place of a person infected, or suspected of being 
infected, with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, or any other 
infectious disease that the Utah Department of Health determines 
cannot be transferred by occupancy of a dwelling place. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1969; 
C.L. 1917, § 4869; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
1-1; L. 1988, ch. 155, § 1; 1990, ch. 308, § 1; 
1991, ch. 10, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Husband and wife, 
property rights, § 30-2-2 et seq. 
Statute of frauds generally, § 25-5-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Construction of deeds. 
—"Convey and warrant." 
—Parties' intent. 
Easements. 
—Restrictive or general. 
—Size. 
Effect of testamentary intent. 
Illustrative cases. 
—Conveyance made. 
—Conveyance not established, 
Interest" in real estate. 
Necessity of deed. 
Oral agreements. 
—Subsequent written contract. 
Quitclaim deeds. 
Cited. 
Construction of deeds. 
—"Convey and warrant.* 
Words "convey and warrant" suffice to pass 
an estate in lands. Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 
348, 85 P.2d 861 (1939). 
—Parties' intent. 
A deed should be construed so as to effectuate 
the intentions and desires of the parties as 
manifested by the language in the deed. Wood 
v. Ashby, 122 Utah 580, 253 R2d 351 (1952). 
Easements. 
—Restrictive or general. 
When a deed creates an easement the cir-
cumstances attending the transaction, the situ-
ation of the parties, and the objects to be 
attained are to be considered in determining 
whether it is a restricted or a general reserva-




ment of the easement granted. Salt Lake City v. 
J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 123 Utah 1, 253 P.2d 
365 (1953). 
Effect of testamentary intent. 
Where decedent intended that deed and bill 
of sale pass property upon his death, deed was 
testamentary in character and intent and was 
inoperative since it did not conform to statutory 
requirements for testamentary disposition. 
First Sec. Bank v. Burgi, 122 Utah 445, 251 
P.2d 297 (1952). 
Illustrative cases. 
—Conveyance made. 
Written instrument signed by equitable 
owner of premises under contract, reciting that 
certain sum had been received from purchaser 
as deposit on purchase of premises and speci-
fying purchase price and terms, when consid-
ered in connection with full payment by pur-
chaser to both equitable and legal owners 
together with warranty deed executed by latter, 
was "conveyance" within meaning of this sec-
tion. Stucki v. Ellis, 114 Utah 486, 201 P.2d 486 
(1949). 
—Conveyance not established. 
Mutual agreements of lessor and lessee that 
defendant act as marketing agent for distribu-
tion of topsoil could not be construed as a 
conveyance of an interest in real estate, since 
the agreements failed to identify defendant as 
grantee, specify the interest granted or de-
scribe in sufficient detail the boundaries of the 
property involved. Wasatch Mines Co. v. 
Hopkinson, 24 Utah 2d 70, 465 R2d 1007 
(1970). 
"Interest" in real estate. 
A transfer of a right to possession would be 
the conveyance of an interest in real estate 
within the meaning of this section. Tarpey v. 
Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P. 338 (1887), 
affd, 142 U.S. 241,12 S. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 
57-1-2 REAL ESTATE 
section, interest in real property may be con-
veyed without use of deed. Stucki v. Ellis, 114 
Utah 486, 201 R2d 486 (1949). 
Oral agreements. 
—Subsequent written contract. 
Bank, drawing up contract for sale of realty 
and omitting therefrom oral agreement that no 
garage was to be erected thereon, could not, 
after accepting payments thereunder for two 
years and after erection of garage by purchaser, 
seek reformation of contract in answer to buy-
er's suit for specific performance, bank being 
guilty of laches and having acquiesced in and 
accepted benefits under contract after becom-
ing aware of mistake. George v. Fritsch Loan & 
Trust Co., 69 Utah 460, 256 P. 400 (1927). 
Quitclaim deeds. 
Statutory form of quitclaim deed is permis-
sive only, and use of words "remise, release and 
quitclaim" in deed to mining claim passed all of 
grantor's title. Ruthrauff v. Silver King W. 
Mining & Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338 
(1938). 
Cited in South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 
1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 2. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 1; 73 C.J.S. 
Property § 16. 
A.L.R. — Air-conditioning appliance, equip-
ment, or apparatus as fixture, 69 A.L.R.4th 
359. 
Specificity of description of premises as af-
fecting enforceability of lease, 73 A.L.R.4th 236. 
Radio or television aerials, antennas, towers, 
or satellite dishes or discs as within terms of 
covenant restricting use, erection, or mainte-
nance of such structures upon residential prop-
erty, 76 A.L.R.4th 498. 
Implied warranty of fitness or suitability in 
commercial leases — modern status, 76 
A.L.R.4th 928. 
Vendor's obligation to disclose to purchaser of 
land presence of contamination from hazardous 
substances or wastes, 12 A.L.R.5th 630. 
Provision in land contract for liquidated 
damages upon default of purchaser as affecting 
right of vendor to maintain action for damages 
for breach of contract, 39 A.L.R.5th 33. 
57-1-2. Words of inheritance not required to pass fee. 
The term "heirs," or other technical words of inheritance or succession, are 
not requisite to transfer a fee in real estate. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1970; 
C.L. 1917, § 4870; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
1-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Words of conveyance. an estate in lands. Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 
Words "convey and warrant" suffice to pass 348, 85 P.2d 861. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds §§ 19, C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 109. 
20. 
57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed. 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance of real 
estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser estate was 
intended. 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1971; 




Determination of scope of conveyance. 
Evidence. 
—Admissible. 
Mortgage or deed. 
Parol evidence. 
Quitclaim reserving rights. 
Words of conveyance. 
—"Convey and warrant." 
—"Title.* 
Condemnation judgment. 
Fee simple title is presumed to be passed by 
a condemnation judgment. Olsen v. Board of 
Educ, 571 R2d 1336 (Utah 1977). 
Determination of scope of conveyance. 
In determining whether a deed, absolute in 
its terms, is intended as a mortgage, elements 
to be considered are whether there was con-
tinuing obligation on part ofgrantor to pay debt 
which it is claimed deed was made to secure, 
question of relative values, contemporaneous 
and subsequent acts, declarations and admis-
sions of parties, form of written evidences of 
transactions, nature and character of testi-
mony relied upon, various business, social, or 
other relationship of parties, and apparent 
aims and purposes to be accomplished. Corey v. 
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940 (1933). 
Evidence. 
—Admissible. 
Extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent in 
making and delivering a quitclaim deed as part 
of an agreement was admissible because it was 
possible the grantor delivered the deed while 
not intending to convey title, and proof of that 
intent was necessary for the court to ascertain 
and enforce the agreement. Capital Assets Fin. 
Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998), afFd sub nom. Capital Assets Fin. Servs. 
v. Maxwell, 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000). 
Mortgage or deed. 
Whether an instrument is a deed or mortgage 
is a matter of the intention of the parties. 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). 
The elements a court must consider when 
determining whether an absolute deed was 
intended as a mortgage include: (1) whether 
question of relative values, (3) contemporane-
ous and subsequent acts of the parties, (4) the 
parties' statements, (5) the form of the written 
evidence of the transactions, (6) the nature of 
the testimony on which the parties rely, (7) the 
relationship between the parties, and (8) the 
apparent aims and purposes of the transfer. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991). 
A deed, absolute in any form, may be con-
strued as a mortgage if it was only intended as 
security under a parol agreement rather than 
as an outright conveyance. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
The party claiming a warranty deed was a 
mortgage must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the conveyance was actually in-
tended as a mortgage. Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
Parol evidence. 
Where conveyances, clear, unambiguous, and 
unequivocal in their terms, are attacked by 
parol evidence seeking to establish a trust or 
give to documents a mortgage construction, the 
party so seeking must by clear, unequivocal and 
satisfactory proof establish the alleged trust or 
mortgage relationship. Corey v. Roberts, 82 
Utah 445, 25 R2d 940 (1933). 
Quitclaim reserving rights. 
Quitclaim of real estate was not presumed to 
have passed fee simple where clause in quit-
claim deed reserve to grantors right to use 
surface of ground for grazing purposes; clause 
indicated that grantor intended to convey 
lesser estate than fee simple notwithstanding 
contention of owners of mining rights on land 
that clause created mere license which was 
personal and as such not transferable. Russell 
v. Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Co, 18 Utah 2d 
363, 423 P.2d 487 (1967). 
Words of conveyance. 
—"Convey and warrant." 
Words "convey and warrant" suffice to pass 
an estate in lands. Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Utah 
348, 85 P.2d 861 (1939). 
-"Tit le ." 
Although the word "title" normally refers to a 
fee simple estate in real estate transactions, it 
can also refer to other types of estates and 
interests, such as in this case of a uniform real 
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ranty deed, since the vendors did not own the 
property in fee simple. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 
P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 152 AX.R. — Deed to railroad company as con-
et seq. veying fee or easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973. 
CJ.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 181. 
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than grantor owns 
— Effect. 
A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for life or years, purporting to 
convey a greater estate than he could lawfully transfer, does not work a 
forfeiture of his estate, but passes to the grantee all the estate which the 
grantor could lawfully transfer. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1972; 
C.L. 1917, § 4872; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
1-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Drazich v. Lasson, 964 R2d 324 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 104. 
§§ 335, 336. 
57-1-5* Creation of joint tenancy presumed — Tenancy in 
common. 
(1) (a) Beginning on May 5, 1997, every ownership interest in real estate 
granted to two persons in their own right who are designated as husband 
and wife in the granting documents is presumed to be a joint tenancy 
interest with rights of survivorship, unless severed, converted, or ex-
pressly declared in the grant to be otherwise. 
(b) Every ownership interest in real estate which does not qualify for 
the joint tenancy presumption as provided in this Subsection (l)(a), is 
presumed to be a tenancy in common interest unless expressly declared in 
the grant to be otherwise. 
(2) (a) Use of words "joint tenancy''or "with rights of survivorship" or "and 
to the survivor of them" or words of similar import means a joint tenancy. 
(b) Use of words "tenancy in common" or "with no rights of survivor-
ship" or "undivided interest" or words of similar import shall declare a 
tenancy in common. 
(3) A sole owner of real property shall create a joint tenancy in himself and 
another or others: 
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(b) by conveying to another person or persons an interest in land in 
which an interest is retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation 
of a joint tenancy by use of the words as provided in Subsection (2)(a). 
(4) In all cases, the interest of joint tenants shall be equal and undivided. 
(5) A "joint tenancy* is converted into a "tenancy in common" by a joint 
tenant by making a bona fide conveyance of the joint tenant's interest in the 
property to himself and another which terminates the joint tenancy. 
(6) This act has no retrospective operation and shall govern instruments 
executed and recorded on or after May 5, 1997. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1973; 
CX.1917, § 4873; R.S 1933 & C. 1943,78-1-5; 
L. 1953, ch. 93, § 1; 1997, ch. 124, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided the 
section; added Subsections (1Kb), (2)(b), (5), 
and (6); in Subsection dXa) substituted "Begin-
ning on May 5,1997, every ownership interest" 
for "Every interest," "who are designated as 
husband and wife in the granting documents is 
presumed to be" for "shall be," and "joint ten-
ancy interest with rights of survivorship" for 
"tenancy in common," deleted "or more" before 
"persons," and inserted "severed, converted, 
or"; substituted "in Subsection (2)(a)" for 
"herein" twice in Subsection (3); and made 
stylistic changes. 
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "This 
act" in Subsection (6) was added by L. 1997, ch. 
124, which amended this section to add the 
presumption of a joint tenancy in married per-
sons. 
Cross-References. — Interparty agree-
ments, § 15-3-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint tenancies. 
—Alienation and execution. 
—Judicial sales. 
—Severance by conveyance or sale. 
—Severance by self-conveyance. 
Joint tenancies. 
—Alienation and execution. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
said that it would assume that "Utah accepts 
the general common-law rules relating to joint 
tenancies, including the rules permitting alien-
ation of the interest of a joint tenant, and 
making its property subject to execution and 
separate sale." Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, 
63 S. Ct. 182, 87 L. Ed. 169 (1942), rehearing 
denied, 317 U.S. 712, 63 S. Ct. 432, 87 L. Ed. 
567 (1943). 
—Judicial sales. 
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obliga-
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase 
of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to 
be for the benefit of all cotenants. Jolley v. 
Corry, 671 R2d 139 (Utah 1983). 
—Severance by conveyance or sale. 
The rule that a joint tenancy is severed by 
one tenant's conveyance applies not only to 
voluntary conveyances, but also to involuntary 
conveyances pursuant to judicial sales. Jolley v. 
Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). 
—Severance by self-conveyance. 
Since the Utah legislature has recognized 
that the use of a strawman to create a joint 
tenancy is unnecessary, continuing to require 
the use of a strawman to sever a joint tenancy 
would create a lopsided body of law wherein 
property owners are required to perpetrate 
legal fictions for one purpose but not for an-
other; thus, a unilateral, recorded self-convey-
ance sufficiently demonstrates an intent to 
sever. Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 
(Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy 
and Joint Ownership § 36 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 6 
et.seq. 
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint 
tenancy by conveyance of divided interest di-
rectly to self, 7 A.L.R.4th 1268. 
Judgment lien or levy of execution on one 
joint tenant's share or interest as severing joint 
tenancy, 51 A.L.R.4th 906. 
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57-1-5.1. Termination of an interest in real estate 
davit. 
Affi-
(1) A document evidencing the termination of joint tenancy, tenancy by the 
entirety, life estate, or determinable or conditional interest in real estate may 
not be recorded unless it is an aflBdavit that meets the requirements of 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The aflBdavit required by Subsection (1) shall: 
(a) cite the interest which is being terminated; 
(b) contain a legal description of the real property that is affected; 
(c) reference the entry number and the book and page of the instrument 
creating the interest to be terminated; and 
(d) if the termination is the result of a death, have attached as an 
exhibit, a copy of the death certificate or other document witnessing the 
death. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-5.1, enacted by L. 
2000, ch. 320, § 1. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 320 
57-1-6 to 57-1-9, Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch 155, § 24 repeals 
§§ 57-1-6 to 57-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, describing the effect of recording an in-
strument on notice to third persons and relat-
became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
ing to the applicability of the chapter, powers of 
attorney, and revocation of instruments, effec-
tive July 1, 1988. For provisions comparable to 
those in § 57-1-6, see § 57-3-2. 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes. 
If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance purport-
ing to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such 
conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards 
acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately 
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall 
be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the 
conveyance. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1979; 
C.L. 1917, § 4879; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-
1-9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Conveyance without ownership. 
ance, after grantor had purported to convey the 
entire fee of such property by warranty deed to 
grantee, gave grantor no rights under the out-
standing lease and all such rights passed to 
grantee at time of the assignment. Cox v. Ney, 
580 R2d 1085 (Utah 1978). 
—After-acquired title. 
Where one who conveyed coal lands subse-
quently acquired title to lands by patent, after-
ns>niiii*nrl f-Jflo lnnr-orl f n orrontpp TCptrVlUm V. 
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Ed. 1198 (1919), appeal dismissed, 254 U.S. name of claim and survey number, he was 
616, 41 S. Ct. 147, 65 L. Ed. 440 (1920). estopped from making any claim to property 
. , described in deed when he subsequently ac-
~TT J c ?£ v e y e l * : , . quired title thereto. Wall v. Utah Copper Co., 
Under this section, one who conveys coal jrji p gr / o ^ n{T 1921) 
lands before he has applied to the government 
to purchase the same conveys a good title Cited in Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. 
thereto. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley
 Bai±y 723 R2d 398 (Utah 1986); Utah Farm 
Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86 (1917). p ^
 C r e d i t A ^ V Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 
Where grantor purporting to convey title to 994 (Utah 1987). 
mining claims described them in his deed by 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds ability insurance, as covering, in absence of 
§§ 341, 342. express provision, after-acquired premises or 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 105. realty, or subsequent additions to described 
AJL.R. — Property insurance, or public li- realty, 18 A.L.R.3d 795. 
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey. 
Any person claiming title to any real estate may, notwithstanding there may 
be an adverse possession thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if he were in the actual possession 
thereof. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L- 1907, § 1980; 
C.L. 1917, § 4880; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-
10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Mainte-
nance §§ 15, 16. 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed — Effect, 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to (insert name), 
grantee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this (month/day/year). 
A warranty deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, rights, and privileges 
thereunto belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs, and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good 
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs, and 
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will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, his heirs, and 
assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to these cov-
enants may be briefly inserted in the deed following the description of the land. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1981; 
C.L. 1917, § 4881; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-
11; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 20. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
lme in the waranty deed form and made stylis-
tic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





Covenant against encumbrances. 
—Waiver. 
Covenants running with land. 




—Signature of witness. 
Interest conveyed. 
Liability of grantor. 
—Materialman's lien. 
Limitation of actions. 
Vendor's lien. 
Way of necessity 
Cited. 
Actions for breach of warranty. 
Where paramount title is in sovereign, pur-
chaser may yield to that title, and such yielding 
constitutes constructive eviction which will 
support action on covenant of warranty. East 
Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber 
Counties Canal Co., 65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 
(1925). 
In an action by a grantee against his grantor 
for breach of warranty because in a quiet title 
action between the grantor and a third person, 
the title was quieted in the third person, the 
grantor cannot assert the defense that because 
the third party had filed no lis pendens the 
grantee was not bound by the earlier decree. 
Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah 559, 252 P.2d 538 
(1953). 
—Irremediable easement . 
In a rescission action for anticipatory repu-
diation of a real estate contract, summary judg-
ment in buyers' favor was authorized, because 
an irremediable easement was not excepted 
from the property description in the contract. 
Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
all easements of permanent character that 
have been created in favor of land sold, and 
which are open and plain to be seen, and are 
reasonably necessary for its use and convenient 
enjoyment, unless expressly reserved by grant-
ees, pass as appurtenances to land; cement 
walk constructed in front of several lots which 
was used as easement in connection with use 
and occupation of lots passed as an appurte-
nance to lots on sale thereof. Rollo v. Nelson, 34 
Utah 116, 96 P. 263, 26 L.R.A. (n.s.) 315 (1908). 
A warranty deed conveys the fee simple title 
"together with all the appurtenances, rights 
and privileges thereunto belonging," by force of 
this section, unless some rights are reserved by 
the terms of the conveyance. Accordingly, deed 
conveyed prescriptive right to conduct water 
through ditch along the right of way without 
any mention of such right, because such ease-
ment for an appurtenant water right is an 
appurtenance to the land. Petrofesa v. Denver 
& R.G.W.R.R., 110 Utah 109, 169 P.2d 808 
(1946). 
—Parol evidence. 
Where there was latent ambiguity as to the 
existence of a ditch and a right of way as an 
appurtenant to the land conveyed by a deed, 
parol evidence was admissible. Egelund v. 
Fayter, 51 Utah 579, 172 P. 313 (1918). 
Where deed, while conveying appurtenances 
as matter of law, was silent as to just what 
appurtenances were, latent ambiguity existed 
which could be explained by parol testimony. 
Wade v. Dorius, 52 Utah 310,173 P. 564 (1918). 
Evidence is admissible to establish what was 
appurtenant to property under statutory form 
of deed, which has effect of passing all appur-
tenances to property, as not varying terms of 
written instrument. Adamson v. Brockbank, 
112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264 (1947). 
—Water r ights . 
Deed of general warranty of quiet and peace-
able possession does not warrant water rights 
unless they are appurtenant to land conveyed. 
George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819 (1901). 
Covenant against encumbrances . 
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enant against encumbrances only "deed restric-
tions and easements of record," an open irriga-
tion ditch which was a prescriptive easement 
and not of record was not excepted from the 
covenant. Jones v. Grow Inv. & Mtg. Co., 11 
Utah 2d 326, 358 R2d 909 (1961). 
With the possible exception of public ease-
ments that are apparent, permanent and irre-
mediable, mere knowledge of the encumbrance 
is not sufficient to exclude it from the operation 
of the covenant against encumbrances. Jones v. 
Grow Inv. & Mtg. Co., 11 Utah 2d 326, 358 P.2d 
909 (1961). 
Grantors by warranty deed were liable for 
breach of covenant against encumbrances when 
a special improvement district levied assess-
ments against the property after its conveyance 
where at the time of the execution of the deed 
the grantors had actual knowledge of the cre-
ation of the special improvement district, knew 
of improvements in various stages of comple-
tion, knew that the cost of the improvements 
was to be assessed against the property trans-
ferred, and assured grantees that the purchase 
price of the property included the improve-
ments, despite fact that at time of conveyance 
there had been neither any actual levy of any 
assessment for improvements nor any recorda-
tion of the improvement district with the 
county recorder. Brewer v. Peatross, 595 P.2d 
866 (Utah 1979). 
Grantees under a warranty deed are entitled 
to recover as damages for breach of covenant 
against encumbrances an amount which is 
fairly and necessarily paid to extinguish the 
encumbrance, not to exceed the purchase price 
paid by grantees for the property, interest, 
court costs, plus attorney fees reasonably in-
curred in contesting the encumbrance, but not 
for attorney fees incurred in breach of covenant 
action against grantor. Forrer v. Sather, 595 
R2d 1306 (Utah 1979). 
Where sellers failed to list utility easements 
in warranty deed, and the deed was placed in 
escrow but not delivered, it was held that there 
was no breach of the covenant against encum-
brances, but that rescission was an appropriate 
remedy since the encumbrances were irremedi-
able and the sellers would not be able to fulfill 
the contract. Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 
(Utah 1984). 
Exception to covenants for quiet possession 
and freedom from encumbrances which stated 
"subject to fence line encroachment along east 
line" was inserted in order to insulate the 
grantor from a suit by the grantee, in the event 
claim of title to a strip of land by acquiescence 
proved to be valid, and there was no evidence to 
suggest that the grantor intended for any rea-
son to reserve to herself title to the strin. 
—Waiver. 
Where there was no genuine dispute that a 
buyer of real property lacked knowledge of a 
pipeline across the property prior to executing a 
contract, the buyer did not waive any rights to 
title without encumbrances. Breuer-Harrison, 
Inc. v. Combe, 799 R2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Covenants running with land. 
The question as to what covenants run with 
the land is a matter of general real property 
law. It may be stated, however, that personal 
covenants do not pass to a subsequent grantee, 
except by assignment. H.T. & C. Co. v. 
Whitehouse, 47 Utah 323, 154 P. 950, 1916D 
L.R.A. 611 (1916). 
A parol agreement in no event runs with the 
land. Knight v. Southern Pac. Co., 52 Utah 42, 
172 P. 689 (1918). 
Covenants of general warranty and for quiet 
enjoyment are covenants running with the 
land. Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 P. 
460 (1924); East Canyon Land & Stock Co. v. 
Davis & Weber Comities Canal Co., 65 Utah 
560, 238 P. 280 (1925). 
Determination of character of instrument. 
An instrument which contains the names of 
the parties to it, the consideration, and a de-
scription of the property is a deed, even if the 
description is not by metes and bounds or by 
numbers, but by reference to another deed then 
on record. These elements, taken with the 
words "gift" and "deed," are sufficient to consti-
tute the writing of a deed of conveyance. 
Cereghino v. Einberg, 4 Utah 514, 11 P. 568 
(1886). 
Whether an instrument is a deed of convey-
ance or a power of attorney depends upon the 
intention of the parties as expressed therein. 
Coltharp v. Coltharp, 48 Utah 389, 160 P. 121 
(1916). 
"Encumbrances* construed. 
The term "encumbrance," as used in deed of 
conveyance, means every right to or interest in 
land which may exist in third persons, to dimi-
nution of value of land, but consistent with 
passing of fee by conveyance. Boothe v. Wyatt, 
54 Utah 550, 183 P. 323 (1919). 
Formal requirements. 
—Presumptions. 
Possession under deed regular upon its face 
carries with it presumption of regularity not-
withstanding it was not recorded until after 
death of grantor. In re Helin's Estate, 55 Utah 
572, 188 P. 633 (1920). 
—Signature of witness . 
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Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14 P. 338 (1887), 
aflTd, 142 U.S. 241,12 S. Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 
(1891). 
Interest conveyed. 
Warranty deed absolute in form is presumed 
to convey fee-simple title, or at least whatever 
title grantor has. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 
462, 189 R2d 118 (1948). 
Liability of grantor. 
—Materialman's lien. 
Grantor of warranty deed held liable for all 
damages sustained by grantee by reason of 
encumbrance of materialman's lien against 
premises. Boothe v. Wyatt, 54 Utah 550,183 P. 
323 (1919). 
Limitation of actions. 
In action on covenant of warranty, statute of 
limitations begins to run from time of eviction; 
action premised on fact that paramount title 
was in United States was timely where com-
menced within year after purchaser found that 
title was in sovereign. East Canyon Land & 
Stock Co. v. Davis & Weber Counties Canal Co , 
65 Utah 560, 238 P. 280 (1925). 
A covenant against encumbrances in war-
ranty deed is, in effect, a covenant to indemnify 
where encumbrance is charge or lien against 
land which can be extinguished by payment, 
and hence statute of limitations begins to run 
when grantee is damnified so that action by 
grantee to recover amount paid to extinguish 
tax lien brought within six years from time of 
payment, but more than six years from time 
deed was given, was not barred by limitations. 
Soderberg v. Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 P.2d 428, 99 
A.L.R. 1041 (1935). 
Vendor's lien. 
In action by vendor against third-party pur-
chaser of real estate which had been conveyed 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 17 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22. 
AX.R. — Validity, construction, and effect of 
contractual provision regarding future revoca-
tion or modification of covenant restricting use 
of real property, 4 A.L.R.3d 570. 
Electronic computing equipment as fixtures, 
6A.L.R.3d497. 
Deed to railroad company as conveying fee or 
easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973. 
Construction of covenant or condition in con-
. .^«Tn M A A o f l n r . / ! fnlo+iTtrT -frr* a n o r m Q n o n f w m n i n -
to original vendee by warranty deed, contention 
that vendor had vendors' lien to assert against 
third-party purchaser was without merit since 
warranty deed conveyed fee simple title. Pollei 
v. Burger, 23 Utah 2d 381, 464 P.2d 377 (1970). 
Way of necessity. 
Where subdivider of farm land into city lots 
conveys separate lots to different persons by 
warranty deeds, purchaser of second lot cannot 
assert right to use of irrigation ditch passing 
through first purchaser's lot, either on theory 
that subdivider reserved easement by implica-
tion or that second purchaser could assert "way 
of necessity" under common law for passage of 
waters over private lands, in view of §§ 73-1-6, 
and 78-34-1, giving right of eminent domain in 
such cases. Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah 509, 243 
P. 922 (1926) (Tb the extent that this case holds 
that there can be no easement by implied grant 
because of right to condemn, it is overruled, 
true test being reasonable necessity existing 
therefor. Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 
185 P.2d 264 (1947)). 
One claiming "way of necessity" across anoth-
er's lands has burden of showing that another 
way could not be had without unreasonable 
labor and expense. Alcorn v. Reading, 66 Utah 
509, 243 P. 922 (1926), overruled on other 
grounds, Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 
185 R2d 264 (1947). 
Reservation of easement of right of way in 
deed conveying land is equivalent for purpose 
of creation of easement to an express grant of 
easement by grantee of land, and latter and his 
successors in interest may be restrained from 
interfering with use of way by successors in 
interest of grantor. Brown v. Christopher, 67 
Utah 278, 247 P. 503 (1926). 
Cited in Webb v. Interstate Land Corp., 920 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1996). 
What constitutes a "building" within restric-
tive covenant, 18 A.L.R.3d 850. 
Incidental use of dwelling for business or 
professional purposes as violation of covenant 
restricting use to residential purposes, 21 
A.L.R.3d 641. 
Covenant restricting use of land, made for 
purpose of guarding against competition, as 
running with land, 25 A.L.R.3d 897. 
Parol exception of fixtures from conveyance 
or lease, 29 A.L.R.3d 1441. 
Recovery of litigation expenses allegedly in-
curred as result of breach of covenant not to 
sue, 30 A.L.R.3d 1433. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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exception or reservation clause, 38 A.L.R.3d 
1419. 
Validity and construction of restrictive cov-
enant requiring consent to construction on lot, 
40A.L.R.3d864. 
Covenant in deed restricting material to be 
used in building construction, 41 A.L.R.3d 
1290. 
Validity and construction of restrictive cov-
ANALYSIS 
After-acquired title. 
Conveyance to deceased person. 
Dissolution of joint tenancy. 
Effect of alteration. 
Interest conveyed. 
Noncompliance with law. 
Release of participating interests. 
Statutory and other forms. 
After-acquired title. 
Quitclaim deed operates to convey estate of 
grantor "at the date of such conveyance," and 
does not convey an after-acquired title. Duncan 
v. Hemmelwright, 112 Utah 262, 186 P.2d 965 
(1947); Barlow Soc'y v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 
723 P.2d 398 (Utah 1986). 
An after-acquired title does not pass by a 
quitclaim deed. Dowse v. Kammerman, 122 
Utah 85, 246 P.2d 881 (1952). 
A quitclaim deed does not raise an estoppel 
as to an after-acquired title. Dowse v. 
enant controlling architectural style of build-
ings to be erected on property, 47 A.L.R.3d 
1232. 
Specificity of description of premises as af-
fecting enforceability of contract to convey real 
property — modern cases, 73 A.L.R.4th 135. 
Title insurer's negligent failure to discover 
and disclose defect as basis for liability in tort, 
19 A.L.R.5th 786. 
Conveyance to deceased person. 
The recordation of an affidavit declaring that 
the person named as an additional grantee on 
an altered quitclaim deed was the affiant's late 
wife was ineffective to effect a conveyance, as 
the wife had died prior to the signing of the 
affidavit, and an attempted conveyance to a 
nonexisting entity, such as a deceased person, 
is void. Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 
Dissolution of joint tenancy. 
A wife's quitclaim deed to her son of her 
interest in property held jointly with her hus-
band changed the husband's interest from a 
joint tenancy to a tenancy in common; the fact 
that the son delayed recording the deed did not 
affect its validity between him and his mother, 
and the husband did not qualify as a subse-
quent purchaser for purposes of the recording 
statute. Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed — Effect. 
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place 
of residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert name), grantee, of 
(here insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this (month/day/year). 
A quitclaim deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of 
a conveyance of all right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the 
premises therein described and all rights, privileges, and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, at the date of the conveyance. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1982; ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
C.L. 1917, § 4882; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1- line in the quitclaim deed form and made 
12; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 21. stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
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57-1-14 REAL ESTATE 
delivery to the grantee does not invalidate the Release of participating interests. 
conveyance from the grantor to the grantee. Release of participating interests (RPI) was 
Julian v. Petersen, 966 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. not a conveyance despite the use of the word 
1998). "quitclaims," but was instead an acknowledge-
_ , ment that previous owner relinquished any 
1Vf1!fS1 . , j / , . -i ,, continued interest in land. Hansen v. Stichting Quitclaim deeds do not imply the conveyance w « T> .. , ™ ,
 o n o ™ c /* .. ! . , * • i.u _*. Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 898 F. Supp. 
of any particular interest in the property. icno/rv TJ* h 199*5) 
Grantee acquires only interest of his grantor, a 
"be that interest what it may." Nix v. Tboele Statutory and other forms. 
County, 101 Utah 84, 118 P.2d 376 (1941). Statutory form of quitclaim deed is permis-
Noncompliance with law, s i v e o n l v > a n d u s e ° f words "remise, release and 
A quitclaim deed to which a name was added quitclaim* in deed to mining claim passed all of 
as an additional grantee after the deed was grantor's title. Ruthrauff v. Silver King W. 
executed by the grantor and dehvered to the Mining & Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338 
grantee, and on which the grantee attempted to (1938). 
reconvey the property to himself and the addi- 9 u r s t a t u t e re^res n o w o r d o f ?rt to Quit-
tional grantee, did not validly convey an inter- claim. In construing whether an instrument 
est to the additional grantee, as the grantee passes title, each case stands on its own words, 
never executed the deed after it was altered combinations thereof, recitals, and other atten-
and there was no evidence of any delivery of the dant facts, having in mind the rule that gener-
deed from the grantee to the additional ally the instrument is construed in favor of the 
grantee. Julian v. Petersen, 966 R2d 878 (Utah grantee. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 123 Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). 123, 255 R2d 989 (1953). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 32 et mises as affecting enforceability of contract to 
seq. convey real property — modern cases, 73 
C J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 22. A.L.R.4th 135. 
A.L.R. — Specificity of description of pre-
57-1-14, Form of mortgage — Effect. 
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the following form: 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of (insert 
place of residence), hereby mortgages to (insert name), 
mortgagee, of (insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following indebtedness (here state 
amount and form of indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to 
whom payable, and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on said pre-
mises, and the sum of dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this (month/day/year). 
A mortgage when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights, privi-
leges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his heirs, 
assigns, and legal representatives, as security for the payment of the indebt-
*™+in wifVi rnvpmants from the mortgagor of general 
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previous to the day appointed for the sale of such lands for taxes; and may be 
foreclosed as provided by law upon any default being made in any of the 
conditions thereof as to payment of either principal, interest, taxes, or 
assessments. 
History: ELS. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1983; 
C.L.1917, § 4883; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-
13; L. 2000, ch. 75, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 




Deed or mortgage. 
Destruction of mortgaged property. 
Equitable mortgage. 
Form. 
Title to mortgaged property. 
Water rights. 
"Conveyance" construed. 
The term "conveyance," as used in this sec-
tion, covers only transactions involving mort-
gages or encumbrances of land and not trans-
fers of title or estate in view of § 57-1-1, so that 
a provision in this section that a mortgage in a 
statutory form "shall have the effect of a con-
veyance of the land" is not inconsistent with 
former § 104-57-7, Code 1943 (§ 78-40-8) pro-
viding that a mortgage "shall not be deemed a 
conveyance, whatever its terms," since the term 
"conveyance" is used in the latter section in its 
common-law meaning as a transfer of title or an 
estate in land. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 
189 P.2d 118 (1948). 
Deed or mortgage. 
A deed which is absolute in form, executed 
and delivered as security under a parol agree-
ment, and with the understanding that it shall 
be so held, will be construed as a mortgage. 
Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232 (1918). 
A deed, when intended as a mortgage, may be 
given to secure an unliquidated claim, or what-
ever indebtedness may thereafter be contem-
plated to be contracted between the parties 
under it, and the same foreclosed in a court of 
equity. Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232 
(1918). 
While a warranty deed which is absolute in 
form is presumed to convey a fee-simple title or 
at least whatever title the grantor has, where a 
written agreement between the parties contem-
poraneous with the deed shows that the deed 
Cross-References. — Foreclosure of mort-
gages, § 78-37-1 et seq. 
Mortgage not deemed a conveyance, § 78-40-
8. 
Remedies for failure to discharge mortgage 
after satisfaction, § 57-1-38. 
mortgage. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 
P.2d 118 (1948). 
A warranty deed, which was absolute in form 
and a contemporaneous written contract recit-
ing the purpose of the conveyance, providing for 
reconveyance upon payment of the amount of 
the mortgage and giving the grantor the right 
to sell the land to a third person, constituted a 
formal mortgage cognizable in a court of law 
rather than a mere equitable mortgage cogni-
zable only in equity such that the grantee did 
not acquire title but was a mere mortgagee. 
Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P2d 118 
(1948). 
Whether an instrument is a deed or a mort-
gage is a matter of the intention of the parties. 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). 
Destruction of mortgaged property. 
A mortgage is an incident to the obligation 
which it is given to secure. Thus, the mortgagor 
and other obligors remain liable for the pay-
ment of the debt if the mortgaged property is 
destroyed. First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89 
Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936). 
Equitable mortgage. 
An equitable mortgage is a lien which equity 
impresses on a property, but in order to obtain 
this mortgage, the mortgagee must resort to 
equity. Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 
156, 48 R2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935). 
In equity, a deed which is absolute upon its 
face may be shown by parol evidence to have 
been given for security purposes only and, upon 
such showing, equity will give effect to the 
intention of the parties. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 
Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). 
Form. 
It is not necessary that an instrument follow 
the form afforded by this section in order to be 
a real estate mortgage, since no particular form 
is necessary so loner as the intention nf tV»P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
57-1-15 REAL ESTATE 
A real estate mortgage need not be contained 
in one writing, but may consist of a warranty 
deed and a separate contract in writing. Bybee 
v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 R2d 118 (1948). 
Although this section sets forth a land mort-
gage form that includes spaces for insertion of 
the amount and terms of the debt, no particular 
form is necessary as long as the writing shows 
the intention of the parties to create a valid 
legal mortgage. The instrument need not show 
the amount of indebtedness as long as it suffi-
ciently discloses the sources from which the 
specific amount may be ascertained. General 
Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 766 R2d 429 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Title to mortgaged property. 
Under this section and former § 104-57-7, 
Code 1943 (§ 78-40-8), regardless of the form of 
instrument used to create a mortgage, the title 
to the mortgaged property remained in the 
mortgagor. First Nat'l Bank v. Haymond, 89 
Utah 151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936). 
Utah is a "lien theory" state; thus, a real 
estate mortgage in this state does not vest title 
in mortgagee but merely creates a lien in his 
favor. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 R2d 
118 (1948). 
Water rights. 
A mortgage which is in statutory form, but 
without a reservation of water, conveys what-
ever rights the grantor has to water appurte-
nant to the land. Thompsbn v. McKinney, 91 
Utah 89, 63 P.2d 1056 (1937). 
Water rights which were found to be appur-
tenant to the land, and which were not reserved 
to the mortgagor in the mortgage or otherwise 
separately conveyed to another, were included 
in the mortgage and passed with the land on 
foreclosure. Thompson v. McKinney, 91 Utah 
89, 63 P.2d 1056 (1937). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages 
§ 12 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 93. 
A.L.R. — Construction of provision in real 
estate mortgage, land contract or other security 
instrument for lease of separate parcels of land 
as payments are made, 41 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Validity and construction of provision of 
mortgage or other real-estate financing con-
tract prohibiting prepayment for a fixed period 
of time, 81 A.L.R.4th 423. 
57-1-15. Effect of recording assignment of mortgage. 
The recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself considered 
notice of the assignment to the mortgagor, his heirs, or personal representa-
tives so as to invalidate any payment made by them or either of them to the 
mortgagee. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-15, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 155, § 2. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1988, ch. 155, § 2 repeals former § 57-1-15, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to the 
revocation or termination of powers executed 
by persons in the armed forces, merchant sea-
men, and federal employees, and enacts the 
present section, effective July 1, 1988. 
57-1-16 to 57-1-18. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 172, § 2 repeals 
§ 57-1-16, as repealed and reenacted by Laws 
1988, ch. 155, § 3, establishing remedies for 
failure to discharge or release satisfied mort-
gage, effective May 2, 1994. For present com-
parable provisions, see § 57-1-38. 
Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals §§ 57-1-17 
and 57-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relat-
ing to powers of attorney, effective July 1,1988. 
57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms. 
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a 
+niQ+ fWH PIS t.ViP nprsnn for whosft benefit a trust deed is eriven. or his 
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(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed 
as security for the performance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections 
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust 
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person 
named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed 
by trust deed, or his successor in interest. 
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section 57-1-1. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch. 
155, § 4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ance by which title to the trust property passes 
. to the trustee. Upon default, the trustee has 
Mortgage distinguished.
 p o w e r ^ s e l l t h e p r 0perty to satisfy the trus-
Trustee must be identified in instrument.
 tor>s debt to the beneficiary. First Sec. Bank v. 
Mortgage distinguished. f a » b < f 7 C ™ s s j ^ 7 8 0 R 2 p d * 2 5 3 ( U t ^ Q 7 1 9 p 8 ^ 
Unhke a trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is ^ m K ^ A C o ^ Q Q v m P a t t e r s o n > 7 9 7 R 2 d 
.... . '. , z. rrn. _i. HOI (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
not a title-conveying instrument. The mort- w 
gagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's Trustee must be identified in instrument. 
interest is a lien on the property to secure Purported deed of trust recorded by savings 
payment of a debt. General Glass Corp. v. Mast and loan association was ineffective as a title-
Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). conveying instrument where it did not identify 
A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in that or name the trustee, who was the grantee 
it is given as security for the performance of an under the deed. General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
obligation. However, a trust deed is a convey- Constr. Co., 766 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54A Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5 et seq. 
§ 146 et seq. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes — 
Effect. 
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance of 
an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a 
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property 
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the 
execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the 
obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like 
manner as if acquired before execution of the trust deed. 
Histoiy: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6. 
57-1-21 REAL ESTATE 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or 
insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws 
of Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah 
under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do 
business in Utah under the laws of Utah; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or 
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor, 
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing 
prior to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement that is 
supplemental to that trust deed. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, 
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 
(iii), (v), or (vi). 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch. tion" in Subsection (D(aXii); and made related 
110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985, ch. 64, § 1; and stylistic changes. 
1996, ch. 182, § 25. "Effective date of this chapter." — The 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- phrase "effective date of this chapter," in Sub-
ment, effective July 1, 1996, added the Subsec- section (1Kb), first appeared in this section as 
tion (l)(a) and (l)(b) designations, redesignat- amended by L. 1985, ch. 64, § 1. That act (L. 
ing former Subsections (l)(a) to (f) as (D(aXi) to
 1 9 8 5 ) c n . 64) took effect on April 29, 1985. (vi); substituted "depository institution as de- Cross-References. - Utah State Bar, § 78-
fined m Section 7-1-103 for T>ank, building g ^ 
and loan association, savings and loan associa-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 5, 78. 
57-1-22. Successor trustees — Appointment by benefi-
ciary — Effect — Substitution of trustee — Re-
cording — Form. 
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for 
record in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the trust 
property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the 
time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the 
power, duties, authority, and title of the trustee named in the deed of trust and 
of any successor trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall: 
(a) identify the trust deed by stating the names of the original parties 
thereto, the date of recordation, and the book and page where the same is 
recorded or the entry number; 
(b) include the legal description of the trust property; 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-23 
(d) be executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficiaries under the 
trust deed or their successors in interest. 
(3) If not previously recorded, at the time of recording the notice of default, 
the successor trustee shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a copy 
thereof shall be sent in the manner provided in Section 57-1-26 to all persons 
to whom a copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by 
Section 57-1-26. In addition thereto, a copy shall be sent to the prior trustee by 
regular mail to his last-known address. 
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if made in substantially the 
following form: 
Substitution of Trustee 
(insert name and address of new trustee) 
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust deed executed by 
as trustor, in which is named beneficiary and as 
trustee, and filed for record (month/day/year), and recorded in Book 
, Page , Records of County, (or filed for record 
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry No. , 
County), Utah. 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment) 
History: L* 1961* ch. 181, § 4; 1981, ch. ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
100, § 1; 1989, ch, 88, § 1; 2000, ch. 75, § 23. lines in the form in Subsection (4). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 79. 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property — Power of trustee — 
Foreclosure of trust deed. 
A power of sale is hereby conferred upon the trustee which the trustee may 
exercise and under which the trust property may be sold in the manner 
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an obligation for which the trust 
property is conveyed as security; or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust 
deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of 
mortgages on real property. The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee 
without express provision therefor in the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 5. 
57-1-24 REAL ESTATE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS tiff sought to foreclose on a trust deed in the 
manner provided for foreclosure of mortgages, 
Joint tenancies.
 e v e n though, in selecting the alternative rem-
Mortgage foreclosure method.
 e d l a i n t i f f o b t a i ned costs and attorney fees 
Procedural requirements.
 fer i n e x c e g g rf t h o g e prQyided foT ^ § ^ . ^ 
L l t e d
* Security Title Co. v. Payless Bldrs. Supply, 17 
Joint tenancies. Utah 2d 179, 407 R2d 141 (1965). 
The rule that a joint tenancy is severed by 
one tenant's conveyance applies not only to Procedural requirements. 
voluntary conveyances, but also to involuntary The detailed procedural requirements for a 
conveyances pursuant to judicial rules. Jolley v. trustee's sale of real property under §§ 57-1-23 
Corry, 671 P2d 139 (Utah 1983). through 57-1-34 are intended to protect the 
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obliga- debtor/trustor, and provide protections that 
tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase substitute for the six-month right of redemp-
of the property at ajudicial sale was deemed to tion guaranteed in judicial mortgage foreclo-
be for the benefit of all cotenants. Jolley v. sures. Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. 
Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (Utah 1983). App. 1988). 
Mortgage foreclosure method. Cited in Timm v. Dewsnup, 1999 UT 105, 
Defendant could not claim error where plain- 990 P.2d 942. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages §§ 599, 600. justifying foreclosure under acceleration provi-
A.L.R, — Failure to keep up insurance as sion in mortgage or deed of trust, 69 A.L.R.3d 
774. 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee — Notice of 
default. 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be exercised until: 
(1) the trustee first files for record, in the office of the recorder of each 
county where the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, 
a notice of default, identifying the trust deed by stating the name of the 
trustor named therein and giving the book and page where the trust deed 
is recorded and a legal description of the trust property, and containing a 
statement that a breach of an obligation for which the trust property was 
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of that 
breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy 
the obligation; 
(2) not less than three months has thereafter elapsed; and 
(3) after the lapse of at least three months the trustee shall give notice 
of sale as provided in this act. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 6; 1967, ch. Meaning of "this act." — Laws 1961, ch. 
131, § 1; 1989, ch. 88, § 2. 181 enacted §§ 57-1-19 through 57-1-36. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS IXS.C. § 362), which provides that the filing of 
.„, ,, .. . , a bankruptcy petition shall operate as a stay of 
Three-month time period.
 a n y ^ to e n f o r c e a ^ a g a i n s t ^ ^ m 
custody of the bankruptcy court, does not sus-Cited. 
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Lewis, 615 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1980). protections the statutory requirements for a 
Trustee's sale was upheld, even though notice nonjudicial foreclosure were intended to en-
ofthe sale was mailed only two months after an sure. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. 
amended notice of default was recorded, be- Mehr, 791 R2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
cause there was no showing that the procedural 
irregularity resulted from fraud or unfair deal- Cited in Nyman v. McDonald, 966 R2d 1210 
ing, and all parties were afforded the rights and (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 621 et seq. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property 
— Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the time and place of sale 
particularly describing the property to be sold: 
(a) by publication of the notice, at least three times, once a week for 
three consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least ten days but not 
more than 30 days prior to the sale, in some newspaper having a general 
circulation in each county in which the property to be sold, or some part 
thereof, is situated; and 
(b) by posting the notice, at least 20 days before the date of sale, in some 
conspicuous place on the property to be sold and also in at least three 
public places of each city or county in which the property to be sold, or 
some part thereof, is situated. 
(2) The sale shall be held at the time and place designated in the notice of 
sale which shall be between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the 
courthouse ofthe county in which the property to be sold, or some part thereof, 
is situated. 
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in substantially the 
following form: 
Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will be sold at public auction to the highest 
bidder, payable in lawful money ofthe United States at the time of sale, at the 
in , County, Utah, on (month/day/year), 
at m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by 
and , his wife, as trustors, in favor of , covering real 
property located at , and more particularly described as: 
(Insert legal description) 
(Certificate of Acknowledgment, if recorded) 
Dated (month/day/year). 
Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 7; 1981, ch. ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Error in notice. place on October 28,1982, where the notice did 
not confuse bidders or result in an undervalu-
"~xYv J - ! y? , . « - A J u . ationofthe property. Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. 
Vahdity of a sale was not affected by a typo- ^
 g j ? 4 3 R 2 d n 5 g ( U t a h 1 9 8 7 ) 
graphical error in a notice dated October 1, 
1983, which indicated that the sale would take 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 608 et seq. 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and no-
tice of sale — Mailing by trustee or beneficiary — 
Publication of notice of default. 
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice 
of sale under any trust deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for 
record of the trust deed and prior to the filing for record of a notice of 
default thereunder, file for record in the office of the county recorder of any 
county in which any part or parcel of the trust property is situated, a duly 
acknowledged request for a copy of any notice of default and notice of sale. 
The request shall set forth the name and address of the person or persons 
requesting copies of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by 
stating the names of the original parties thereto, the date of filing for 
record thereof, the book and page where the same is recorded or the 
recorder's entry number, and the legal description of the trust property. 
The request shall be in substantially the following form: 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of default and a copy 
of notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record 
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records 
of County, (or filed for record (month/day/year), with 
recorder's entry number , County), Utah, executed by 
as trustor, in which is named as beneficiary and 
as trustee, be mailed to (insert name) at 
(insert address) 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature 
(Certificate of Acknowledgement) 
(b) Upon filing for record of a request for notice, the recorder shall index 
the request in the mortgagor's index, mortgagee's index, and abstract 
record. Except as provided in this section, the trustee under any such deed 
of trust is not required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any 
person not filing a request for notice as described herein. 
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prepaid, a copy of such notice with the recording date shown thereon, 
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in the request. At least 20 days 
before the date of sale, the trustee shall mail, by certified or registered mail, 
with postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, 
addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a request 
therefor which has been recorded prior to the filing for record of the notice of 
default, directed to the address designated in the request. 
(3) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default 
and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder be mailed to any person a party 
thereto at the address of the person set forth therein, and a copy of any notice 
of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each such person at the 
same time and in the same manner required as though a separate request 
therefor had been filed by each of such persons as provided in this section. 
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request 
for notice by the trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, a copy 
of the notice of default shall be published at least three times, once a week for 
three consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in each county 
in which the trust property, or some part thereof, is situated, such publication 
to commence not later than ten days after the filing for record of the notice of 
default. In lieu of this publication, a copy of the notice of default may be 
delivered personally to the trustor within the ten days or at any time before 
publication is completed. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record pursuant to this 
section, nor any statement or allegation in any such request, nor any record 
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property or be considered notice to any 
person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale 
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the trust 
property. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 8; 1980, ch. 57, ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
§ 1; 1981, ch. 100, § 3; 1989, ch. 88, § 4; 2000, lines in the form in Subsection (l)(a) and made 
ch. 75, § 25. stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Hall v. NACM Inter-
mountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, 988 P.2d 942. 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by public auction — Post-
ponement of sale. 
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, 
the trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public 
auction to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may 
conduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
interest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust property 
shall be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or parcels which can 
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bid at the sale. Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purchaser 
refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold to him at the sale, 
the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell the property at any 
time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay the bid price is liable for 
any loss occasioned by the refusal, including interest, costs, and trustee's and 
reasonable attorneys' fees. The trustee or the attorney for the trustee may 
thereafter reject any other bid of that person. 
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedi-
ent, postpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. If the last hour of 
the postponement falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale 
may be postponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday. The person conducting the sale shall give notice 
of the postponement by public declaration at the time and place last appointed 
for the sale. No other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the sale 
is postponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice 
of sale. In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
renoticed in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be 
given. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, 
§ 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fair market value bid. the trustee was required by the statute to 
Atrust deed beneficiary's offer of "fair market accept it. Thus, the trustee was not permitted 
value* for property sold at a trustee's sale was to postpone, cancel, or renotice the sale pursu-
the equivalent of a fixed-dollar offer and was ant to Subsection (2). Thomas v. Johnson, 801 
therefore a bid for purposes of Subsection (1). R2d 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
As the only bid, it was also the highest bid, and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 622 et seq. property subject to order of foreclosure and sale 
A.L.R. — Mortgagor's interference with as contempt of court, 54 A.L.R.3d 1242. 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee — Payment of 
bid — Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser — 
Recitals — Effect. 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price bid as directed by the 
trustee and upon receipt of payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his 
deed to such purchaser. The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance 
with the requirements of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to the 
exercise of the power of sale and sale of the property described therein, 
including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery, and publication of 
the notice of default, any mailing and the publication and posting of the notice 
of sale, and the conduct of sale. These recitals constitute prima facie evidence 
of such compliance and are conclusive evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers 
and encumbrancers for value and without notice. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right 
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or under them, in and to the property sold, including all such right, title, 
interest, and claim in and to such property acquired by the trustor or his 
successors in interest subsequent to the execution of the trust deed. 
History: U 1961, ch. 181, § 10; 1985, ch. 
68, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty 
Servs., Inc., 743 R2d 1158 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 645 et seq. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale — Disposition. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the costs 
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the 
payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the 
amount which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the 
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person or 
persons legally entitled to the proceeds, or the trustee, in his discretion, may 
deposit the balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district court of the 
county in which the sale took place. Upon depositing the balance, the trustee 
shall be discharged from all further responsibility and the clerk shall deposit 
the proceeds with the state treasurer subject to the order of the district court. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 11; 1997, ch. before "clerk* and inserted "district court of 
215, § 7. the" near the end of the first sentence; substi-
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- tuted "state" for "county" in the second sen-
ment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "county" tence; and made stylistic changes throughout. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Duties of trustee. order to assist certain interest holders at the 
A trustee under trust deed has an affirmative expense of others. Randall v. Valley Title, 681 
duty to uphold his statutory responsibilities, R2d 219 (Utah 1984). 
and may not ignore those responsibilities in 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 664 et seq. 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee — Corporate 
stock evidencing water rights given to secure 
trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights used, intended to be used, 
or suitable for use on the trust property and which are hypothecated to secure 
an obligation secured bv a trust do^ H mav v»n aniA TT^ +I^  A,* ±—± •— 
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History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 12. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
same catchline following § 57-1-24. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds — Default in performance of obliga-
tions secured — Reinstatement — Cancellation 
of recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured 
by a trust deed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in the obligation, become 
due or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, including a default in the payment 
of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, 
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by the beneficiary in 
accordance with terms of the obligation or of the trust deed, the trustor or his 
successor in interest in the trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any time within three months of 
the filing for record of notice of default under the trust deed^if the power of sale 
is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the 
entire amount then due under the terms of the trust deed (including costs and 
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, or trust 
deed, and the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred) other than that 
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and 
thereby cure the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the 
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force 
and effect the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed reinstated in the manner 
provided in Subsection (1), the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of 
any person having an interest in the trust property, execute and deliver to him 
a request to the trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under the trust deed; and any beneficiary under 
a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for a period of 30 days after such demand, 
refuses to request the trustee to execute and deliver this cancellation is liable 
to the person entitled to such request for all damages resulting from this 
refusal. A release and reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or both, 
or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation of a notice of 
default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a trust 
deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is sufficient if made 
and executed by the trustee in substantially the following form: 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice of default filed for record 
(month/day/year), and recorded in Book , Page , Records of 
County, (or filed of record (month/day/year), with record-
er's entry No , County), Utah, which notice of default refers to 
the trust deed executed by as trustor, in which is named as 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-31 
County, (or filed of record 
No , County), Utah 
(month/day/year), with recorder's entry 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 13; 1967, ch. 
131, § 2; 1981, ch. 100, § 4; 1985, ch. 68, § 3; 
2000, ch. 75, § 26. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
lines in the form in Subsection (2) and made 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 










The 1985 amendment to this section could 
not be retroactively applied to a contractual 
transaction entered into before the amend-
ment, where the amendment affected the debt-
or's substantive contractual rights by eliminat-
ing his right to cure a default under his trust 
deed and note by paying only the amount in 
default. Washington Natl Ins. Co. v. Sherwood 
Assocs., 795 R2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Effect. 
The 1985 amendment of this section changed 
the law to require the debtor to pay the entire 
amount of the note in order to cure his default 
in a judicial foreclosure proceeding. Washing-
ton Natl Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 R2d 
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Debt acceleration. 
Debt acceleration is a substantive right be-
cause it provides a beneficiary with the power 
to bring a single foreclosure action upon de-
fault, thereby satisfying the entire obligation 
and discharging the note, rather than bringing 
repeated collection actions each time a trustor 
defaults. The beneficiary thereby avoids the 
burden of repeated foreclosures as well as the 
risk that the security for the debt, the property, 
will be consumed by legal fees, court costs, 
unpaid interest, etc., before the debt is satis-
fied. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 
P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"Deacceleration" is the undoing of the accel-
eration itself. The parties are returned to their 
preacceleration status as if the beneficiary of 
the trust deed had not opted to accelerate the 
entire debt. The default, however, remains un-
changed and the notice of default would still be 
in effect. A beneficiary could still foreclose, but 
it would only be for the amount of the delin-
quent payments, costs, and so forth. The note 
would remain in effect to the extent not satis-
fied from the sale proceeds and the trustor 
would retain any property not sold to satisfy 
the delinquency. Progressive Acquisition, Inc. v. 
Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Default not cured. 
The plaintiff had no duty to fulfill his offer to 
treat the defendants' default as cured when 
that offer was predicated upon payment of the 
arrearage, taxes, and insurance, and only the 
arrearage had been paid. Grossen v. DeWitt, 
1999 UT App 167, 982 P2d 581. 
Reinstatement. 
"Reinstatement," as it is used in this section, 
is the curing of the default. In other words, the 
parties are returned to their former status as if 
the default had never occurred. If a trustor 
subsequently defaults again, the beneficiary 
must begin new foreclosure proceedings. It may 
not rely on the previous notice of default and 
declaration of acceleration. Progressive Acqui-
sition, Inc. v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 547. 
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57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee — Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which 
trust deed was given as security — Collection of 
costs and attorney's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust 
deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, 
and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such 
property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. Before 
rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the date of 
sale of the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more than the 
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair 
market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. 









Preemption by federal law. 
Prevailing party. 
Procedural failure. 
Purpose of section. 
Cited. 
Attorney fees. 
Trial court did not err in granting debtors 
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party, 
because, although a judgment was entered 
against them, they prevailed on the only con-
tested issue at trial. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. 
Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Deficiency judgment. 
When a creditor takes more than one item of 
security upon an obligation secured by a trust 
deed, the creditor is not precluded from making 
use of that additional security merely because 
the creditor has not sought a deficiency judg-
ment within three months of a nonjudicial sale 
of one of the items covered bv the trust deed 
to maintain its right to the additional security, 
so long as the security is applied toward the 
debt owed on the original loan. Phillips v. Utah 
State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174 (Utah 1991). 
A "sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor," who 
became unsecured by a senior lienor's foreclo-
sure, was not pursuing a "deficiency judgment" 
and, therefore, was not limited by the fair 
market value provision of this section from 
pursuing its claim against the debtor person-
ally. City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 
P.2d 234 (Utah 1991). 
The protections of the Utah Trust Deed Act 
(§§ 57-1-19 to 57-1-36) apply to any action to 
recover the balance due on an obligation se-
cured by a trust deed, following a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale, and makes no distinction 
whether it is brought against the debtor or a 
guarantor; thus, the three-month statute of 
limitations applied to bar an action against the 
guarantors of an obligation and, even if the 
action had been timely filed, the fair value 
credit would have required plaintiff to credit 
the fair market value toward the deficiency, 
preventing a double recovery from defendants 
as either guarantors or debtors. Surety Life 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995). 
Exclusive remedy. 
This section provides the exclusive remedy 
for securing a deficiency judgment following a 
sale of real Dronertv under a trust deed, thereby 
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P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985); Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 
1987). 
Multiple liens. 
The burden of protecting property subject to 
multiple liens is on the debtor, not on the junior 
lienholder. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134 
(Utah 1992). 
Notice. 
The primary purpose of the three-month 
limitation period contained in this section is 
satisfied when the foreclosing party provides 
notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be 
sought by filing the action. Standard Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 R2d 1136 (Utah 
1991). 
One-action rule. 
A pretrial stipulation between a debtor and 
the debtor's junior lienholder to limit the junior 
lienholder's judgment to the difference between 
the debt owed and the fair market value of the 
property at the time of sale was meant to apply 
to the deficiency judgment after sale, as pro-
vided by this section, so when the trial court 
later ruled that the junior henholders were 
entitled to collect against the underlying obli-
gation, as their security had been extinguished 
through the intervening trustee's sale by the 
senior lienholder, the one-action rule (§ 78-37-
1) did not limit the junior lienholder's judgment 
because defendants' conduct was not blamewor-
thy. Sanders v. Ovard, 838 P.2d 1134 (Utah 
1992). 
Out-of-state lands. 
Deficiency judgment protection requiring 
that fair market value of property at time of 
sale be used as setoff is not extended to debtors 
whose obligations are secured by trust deeds on 
land outside Utah. Bullington v. Mize, 25 Utah 
2d 173, 478 P.2d 500, 44 A.L.R.3d 910 (1970). 
Preemption by federal law. 
The three-month limitation of this section 
could not be used to bar the Small Business 
Administration's post-foreclosure deficiency ac-
tion against guarantor, as to do so would violate 
the well-established maxim that the United 
States is exempt from application of state stat-
utes of limitation. United States v. Johnson, 
946 F. Supp. 915 (D. Utah 1996). 
COLLATERAL 
Prevai l ing par ty . 
If a party seeking a deficiency judgment can 
convince the court that the debt exceeds the fair 
market value of the property, then that party is 
entitled to a deficiency judgment and prevails 
under this section; however, if the party defend-
ing such an action successfully maintains that 
the fair market value of the property equals or 
exceeds the total indebtedness, then that party 
prevails. First S.W. Fin. v. Sessions, 875 P.2d 
553 (Utah 1994). 
Procedural failure. 
This section, which gives a creditor three 
months after a sale of property under a trust 
deed to bring an action for any amounts re-
maining unpaid, does not permanently bar fur-
ther proceedings any time some procedural 
failing results in the dismissal of a properly 
filed action. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
Purpose of section. 
The purpose of this section is to protect the 
debtor, who in a nonjudicial foreclosure has no 
right of redemption, from a creditor who could 
purchase the property at the sale for a low price 
and then hold the debtor liable for a large 
deficiency. First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987). 
This section limits only the rights of the 
beneficiary under the trust deed that was fore-
closed — it does not affect the rights and 
obligations of parties to other trust deeds. The 
statute does not purport to address the status 
of obligations secured by junior trust deeds 
following a trustee sale pursuant to a senior 
trust deed. G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
By its terms and legislative history, this 
section provides a remedy for a creditor facing a 
defaulting debtor; where debtors did not de-
fault on creditor's mortgage, section was inap-
plicable. Associates Fin. Servs. v. Slaugh, 850 
R2d 1278 (Utah 1993). 
Cited in Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1988); Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 
186 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Citicorp Mtg., Inc. v. 
Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992); SLC Ltd. V v. 
Bradford Group W., Inc., 152 Bankr. 755 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1993). 
REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59AC.J.S. Mortgages § 674 et seq. neys' fees in matters involving real estate, 10 
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or adequacy of attor- A.L.R.5th 448. 
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57-1-33. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 172, § 2 repeals upon satisfaction of an obligation secured by a 
§ 57-1-33, as enacted by Laws 1961, ch. 181, trust deed, effective May 2, 1994. 
§ 15, requiring reconveyance of trust property 
57-1-33.1. Reconveyance of a trust deed. 
(1) (a) When an obligation secured by a trust deed has been satisfied, the 
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust 
property. 
(b) At the time the beneficiary requests a reconveyance under Subsec-
tion (l)(a), the beneficiary shall deliver to the trustee or the trustee's 
successor in interest the trust deed and the note or other evidence that the 
obligation securing the trust deed has been satisfied. 
(2) The reconveyance under Subsection (1) may designate the grantee as 
"the person or persons entitled thereto." 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-33.1, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 1. 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee — Foreclosure 
of trust deed — Limitation of actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, or an action 
to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on 
real property shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59A C.J.S. Mortgages § 603. 
57-1-35. Trust deeds — Transfer of secured debts as trans-
fer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer 
of the security therefor. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 17. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 336 et seq. 
57-1-36. Trust deeds — Instruments entitled to be re-
corded — Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
CONVEYANCES 57-1-38 
property, and any instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or 
waived as to priority, if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be 
recorded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust 
deed does not in itself impart notice of the assignment to the trustor, his heirs 
or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by any of 
them to the person holding the note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the 
obligation by the trust deed. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 18; 1988, ch. Cross-References. — Recorder's fees, § 21-
155, § 5. 2-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 
1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 194. 
57-1-37. Failure to disclose not a basis for liability. 
(1) The failure of an owner of real property to disclose that the property 
being offered for sale is stigmatized is not a material fact that must be 
disclosed in the transaction of real property. 
(2) Neither an owner nor his agent is liable for failing to disclose that the 
property is stigmatized. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-37, enacted by L. 
1990, ch. 308, § 2; 1991, ch. 5, § 55. 
57-1-38. Release of security interest. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Secured lender" means: 
(i) a mortgagee on a mortgage; 
(ii) a beneficiary on a trust deed; 
(iii) a person that holds or retains legal title to real property as 
security for financing the purchase of the real property under a real 
estate sales contract; and 
(iv) any other person that holds or retains a security interest in real 
property to secure the repayment of a secured loan. 
(b) (i) "Secured loan" means a loan or extension of credit, the repay-
ment of which is secured by a mortgage, a trust deed, the holding or 
retention of legal title under a real estate sales contract, or other 
security interest in real property, whether or not the security interest 
is perfected. 
(ii) A judgment award secured by a judgment lien is not of itself a 
secured loan. A subsequent written agreement between a judgment 
creditor and a judgment debtor concerning payment of the judgment 
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(c) "Security interest" means an interest in real property that secures 
payment or performance of an obligation. Security interest includes a lien 
or encumbrance. 
(d) "Servicer" means a person that services and receives loan payments 
on behalf of a secured lender with respect to a secured loan. 
(2) This section may not be interpreted to validate, invalidate, alter, or 
otherwise affect the foreclosure of a mortgage, the exercise of a trustee's power 
of sale, the exercise of a seller's right of reentry under a real estate sales 
contract, or the exercise of any other power or remedy of a secured lender to 
enforce the repayment of a secured loan. 
(3) A secured lender or servicer who fails to release the security interest on 
a secured loan within 90 days after receipt of the final payment of the loan is 
liable to another secured lender on the real property or the owner or titleholder 
of the real property for: 
(a) the greater of $1,000 or treble actual damages incurred because of 
the failure to release the security interest, including all expenses incurred 
in completing a quiet title action; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. 
(4) A secured lender or servicer is not liable under Subsection (3) if the 
secured lender or servicer: 
(a) has established a reasonable procedure to release the security 
interest on a secured loan in a timely manner after the final payment on 
the loan; 
(b) has complied with this procedure in good faith; and 
(c) is unable to release the security interest within 90 days after receipt 
of the final payment because of the action or inaction of an agency or other 
person beyond its direct control. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-38, enacted by L-
1994, ch. 172, § 1; 1995, ch. 185, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following 
annotations were taken from cases decided 
under former statutory provisions. 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
—Mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. 
Attorney's fee. 
Construction of section. 
Defenses. 
—Good faith. 
Form of release. 
—Notation on deed. 
Inference created by reconveyance. 
Liability of mortgagee. 
—Breach of contract. 
Proof of damages. 
Refusal to reconvey. 
Statutory construction. 
nor common law permits recovery of damages 
for refusal to clear title. Jack B. Parson Cos. v. 
Nield, 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). 
—Mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. 
This section had no application to case where 
demand that release be executed was made by 
plaintiff, who was not a mortgagor, upon a 
mortgagee who had never occupied that posi-
tion to plaintiff, or anyone in privity with 
plaintiff. Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 115 
Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 (1949). 
Attorney's fee. 
Attorney's fees incurred by mortgagor in 
bringing suit to cancel mortgage and note and 
to recover damages against mortgagee were 
proper item of damage to be assessed against 
mortgagee. Swaner v. Union Mtg. Co., 99 Utah 
298, 105 P.2d 342 (1940). 
Construction of section. 
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or declare a mortgage of record because he 
believes that there has been no full satisfaction. 
Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 
R2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Defenses. 
—Good faith. 
Where a bank, relying upon the advice of 
attorney and honestly thinking it had valid and 
subsisting mortgages against appellant which 
had not been satisfied, refused to release the 
mortgages, it was acting in good faith and was 
not liable for damages under this section. 
Shibata v. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 
395, 205 P.2d 251 (1949). 
Form of release. 
—Notation on deed. 
A deed of trust to raise a fund to pay a debt 
could not be released on the margin of the 
record, as provided by former statute, in the 
case of a trust deed given as security for a debt. 
Dupee v. Rose, 10 Utah 305, 37 P. 567 (1894). 
Inference created by reconveyance. 
Trustee's reconveyance by deed of the trust 
property created an independent inference that 
the obligation secured by the trust deed had 
been satisfied rather than renewed. Peterson v. 
United States, 511F. Supp. 250 (D. Utah 1981). 
Liability of mortgagee. 
—Breach of contract. 
Mortgagee who refused to advance money for 
construction of house according to agreement, 
but who used position to coerce mortgagor in 
another transaction, could not claim that he 
was acting in good faith so as to escape liability 
under this section for failure to satisfy mort-
gage. Swaner v. Union Mtg. Co., 99 Utah 298, 
105 R2d 342 (1940). 
Proof of damages. 
Where there are both chattel mortgages and 
real estate mortgages which are not released it 
is not incumbent that the person damaged 
separate and prove separately his damages. 
Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Co., 4 Utah 2d 117, 288 
P.2d 456 (1955). 
Refusal to reconvey. 
Mortgage lender's use of the leverage of re-
fusing to reconvey land securing a trust deed in 
order to obtain security for another debt was 
not good faith on the part of the lender, not-
withstanding its contention that it was indus-
try practice to provide security for bonds and 
that the intent of the parties could not have 
been otherwise. Hector, Inc. v. United Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987). 
Statutory construction. 
This section is penal in nature and should be 
strictly construed. Shibata v. Bear River State 
Bank, 115 Utah 395, 205 R2d 251 (1949). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 479. vening between old and new mortgages, 43 
A.L.R. — Discharge of mortgage and taking A.L.R.5th 519. 
back of new mortgage as affecting lien inter-
57-1-39, Definitions. 
As used in Sections 57-1-40 and 57-1-44: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the record owner of the beneficiary's interest 
under a trust deed, including successors in interest. 
(2) "Mortgage" is as described in Section 57-1-14. 
(3) "Mortgagee" means the record owner of the mortgagee's interest 
under a mortgage, including a successor in interest. 
(4) "Satisfactory evidence of the full payment of the obligation secured 
by a trust deed or mortgage" means the original cancelled check or a copy 
of a check, including a voucher copy, payable to the beneficiary or a 
servicer, and reasonable documentary evidence that the check was in-
tended to effect full payment under the trust deed or an encumbrance 
upon the property covered by the trust deed. 
(5) "Servicer" means a person or entity that collects loan navments on 
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(6) "Title agent" means a title insurance agent licensed as an orgai 
tion under Title 31A, Chapter 23, Part II, Licensing of Agents, Brokers 
Consultants. 
(7) "Title insurer" means a title insurer authorized to conduct busi 
in the state under Title 31A, Chapter 23, Part II, Licensing of Ag 
Brokers and Consultants. 
(8) "Trust deed" is as defined in Subsection 57-1-19(3). 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-39, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 3. 
57-1-40. Reconveyance of trust deed or release of m 
gage — Procedures — Forms. 
(1) A title insurer or title agent may reconvey a trust deed or rele* 
mortgage in accordance with the provisions of Subsections (2) through 0 
(a) the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage has been 
paid by the title insurer or title agent; or 
(b) the title insurer or title agent possesses satisfactory evidence ( 
full payment of the obligation secured by a trust deed or mortgage. 
(2) A title insurer or title agent may reconvey a trust deed or rele, 
mortgage under Subsection (1) regardless of whether the title insurer oi 
agent is named as a trustee under a trust deed or has the authority to re 
a mortgage. 
(3) No sooner than 30 days after payment in full of the obligation secur 
a trust deed or mortgage, the title insurer or title agent shall deliver 1 
beneficiary, mortgagee, or servicer, or send by certified mail to the benefi 
mortgagee, or servicer at the address specified in the trust deed or mort 
at any address for the beneficiary or mortgagee specified in the last rec 
assignment of the trust deed or mortgage, and at any address fo 
beneficiary, mortgagee, or servicer specified in a request for notice rec 
under Section 57-1-26, a notice of intent to release or reconvey and a copy 
release or reconveyance to be recorded as provided in Sections (4) and ( 
(4) The notice of intent to release or reconvey shall contain the name 
beneficiary or mortgagee and the servicer if loan payments on the trust d 
mortgage are collected by a servicer, the name of the title insurer or title <-
the date, and be substantially in the following form: 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RELEASE OR RECONVEY 
Notice is hereby given to you as follows: 
1. This notice concerns the (trust deed or mortgage) describ 
follows: 
(Trustor or Mortgagor): 





2. The undersigned claims to have paid in full or possesses satisi 
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3. The undersigned will fully release the mortgage or reconvey the trust 
deed described in this notice unless, within 60 days from the date stated 
on this notice, the undersigned has received by certified mail a notice 
stating that the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage has not 
been paid in full or that you otherwise object to the release of the mortgage 
or the reconveyance of the trust deed. Notice shall be mailed to the address 
stated on this form. 
4. A copy of the (release of mortgage or reconveyance of trust deed) is 
enclosed with this notice. 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent) 
(Address of title insurer or title agent) 
(5) (a) If, within 60 days from the day on which the title insurer or title 
agent delivered or mailed the notice of intent to release or reconvey in 
accordance with Subsections (3) and (4), the beneficiary, mortgagee, or 
servicer does not send by certified mail to the title insurer or title agent a 
notice that the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage has not 
been paid in full or that the beneficiary, mortgagee, or servicer objects to 
the release of the mortgage or reconveyance of the trust deed, the title 
insurer or title agent may execute, acknowledge, and record a reconvey-
ance of a trust deed or release of a mortgage. 
(b) A reconveyance of a trust deed under Subsection (5)(a) shall be in 
substantially the following form: 
RECONVEYANCE OF TRUST DEED 
(Name of title insurer or title agent), a (title insurer or title agent) 
authorized to conduct business in the state does hereby reconvey, without 
warranty, the following trust property located in (name of county) County, 
state of Utah, that is covered by a trust deed naming (name of trustor) as 
trustor, and (name of beneficiary) as beneficiary and was recorded on 
(date) in Book at Page as Entry Number : (insert 
a description of the trust property.) 
The undersigned title insurer or title agent certifies as follows: 
1. The undersigned title insurer or title agent has fully paid the 
obligation secured by the trust deed or possesses satisfactory evidence 
of the full payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed. 
2. No sooner than 30 days after payment in full of the obligation 
secured by the trust deed, the title insurer or title agent delivered or 
sent by certified mail to the beneficiary or servicer at the address 
specified in the trust deed, at any address for the beneficiary specified 
in the last recorded assignment of the trust deed, and at any address 
for the beneficiary or servicer specified in a request for notice recorded 
under Section 57-1-26, a notice of intent to release or reconvey and a 
copy of the reconveyance. 
3. The title insurer or title agent did not receive, within 60 days 
from the day on which the title insurer or title agent delivered or 
mailed the notice of intent to release or reconvey, a notice from the 
beneficiary or servicer sent by certified mail that the obligation 
secured by the trust deed has not been paid in full or that the 
57-1-40 REAL ESTATE 
(Notarization) 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent) 
(c) A release of a mortgage under Subsection (5)(a) shall be in substan-
tially the following form: 
RELEASE OF MORTGAGE 
(Name of title insurer or title agent), a (title insurer or title agent) 
authorized to conduct business in the state does hereby release the 
mortgage on the following property located in (name of county) County, 
state of Utah, that is covered by a mortgage naming (name of mortgagor) 
as mortgagor, and (name of mortgagee) as mortgagee and was recorded on 
(date) in Book at Page as Entry Number : (insert 
a description of the trust property.) 
The undersigned title insurer or title agent certifies as follows: 
1. The undersigned title insurer or title agent has fully paid the 
obligation secured by the mortgage or possesses satisfactory evidence 
of the full payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage. 
2. No sooner than 30 days after payment in full of the obligation 
secured by the mortgage, the title insurer or title agent delivered to 
the mortgagee or sent by certified mail to the mortgagee or servicer at 
the address specified in the mortgage and at any address for the 
mortgagee specified in the last recorded assignment of the mortgage, 
a notice of intent to release or reconvey and a copy of the release. 
3. The title insurer or title agent did not receive, within 60 days 
from the day on which the title insurer or title agent delivered or 
mailed the notice of intent to release or reconvey, a notice from the 
mortgagee or servicer sent by certified mail that the obligation 
secured by the mortgage has not been paid in full or that the 
mortgagee or servicer objects to the release of the mortgage. 
(Notarization) 
(Signature of title insurer or title agent) 
(d) (i) A release of mortgage or reconveyance of trust deed that is 
executed and notarized in accordance with Subsections (5)(b) or (c) is 
4
 entitled to recordation. 
(ii) (A) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii)(B), a reconvey-
ance of a trust deed or release of a mortgage that is recorded 
under Subsection (5)(d)(i) is valid regardless of any deficiency in 
the release or reconveyance procedure not disclosed in the release 
of mortgage or reconveyance of trust deed. 
(B) If the title insurer's or title agent's signature on a release of 
mortgage or reconveyance of trust deed recorded under Subsec-
tion (5)(d)(ii)(A) is forged, the release of mortgage or reconveyance 
of trust deed is void. 
(6) A release of mortgage or reconveyance of trust deed under this section 
does not discharge an obligation that was secured hv tho tmat dppd or 
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History: C. 1953, 57-1-40, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 4. 
57-1-41. Objections to reconveyance or release. 
A title insurer or title agent may not record a reconveyance of trust deed or 
release of mortgage if, within 60 days from the day on which the title insurer 
or title agent delivered or mailed the notice of intent to release or reconvey in 
accordance with Subsections 57-1-40(3) and (4), the beneficiary, mortgagee, or 
servicer sends a notice that the obligation secured by the trust deed or 
mortgage has not been paid in full or objects to the release of the mortgage or 
reconveyance of the trust deed under Subsection (5)(a). 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-41, enacted by L, 
1995, ch. 185, § 5. 
57-1-42. Liability of title insurer or title agent. 
A title insurer or title agent purporting to act under the provisions of Section 
57-1-40 who reconveys a trust deed or releases a mortgage is liable to the 
beneficiary or mortgagee for the damages suffered as a result of the reconvey-
ance if: 
(1) the obligation secured by the trust deed or mortgage has not been 
fully paid; and 
(2) (a) the title insurer or title agent failed to comply with the provi-
sions of Sections 57-1-40 and 57-1-41; or 
(b) the title insurer or title agent acted with gross negligence or in 
bad faith in reconveying the trust deed. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-42, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 6. 
57-1-43. Application of provisions. 
The provisions of Sections 57-1-39 through 57-1-42 apply to any obligation 
secured by a trust deed or mortgage that was paid prior to, on, or after May 1, 
1995. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-43, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 7. 
57-1-44. Other sections not affected. 
Sections 57-1-39 through 57-1-43 do not excuse a beneficiary, mortgagee, 
trustee, secured lender, or servicer from complying with the provisions of 
Section 57-1-38. 
History: C. 1953, 57-1-44, enacted by L. 
1995, ch. 185, § 8. 
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WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Pinnacle Title Insurance Agency, Inc. 
Attn: David Stevenson 
5505 South 900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
WASATCH COUHTY COftpHRflTTON 
S002 SEP 10 S:15p» *>* 17.00 fiwr. 
FOR PINNACLE TITLE 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by Pinnacle Title Insurance Agency. Inc., a Utah 
corporation ("TRUSTEE"), that a default has occurred under that certain DEED OF 
TRUST WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS dated as of August 10, 2001 (the "Trust Dce<T)t 
executed by Springs of St. Moritz Resort, LLC. ("TRUSTOR"), in favor of Pinnacle Title 
Insurance Agency, Inc., trustee ("TKUSTEF'), for the benefit of Wilshire Investments, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company ("BENETIC1ARY), such Trust Deed having been 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Wasatch County, State of Utah, on 
August 29, 2001, as Entry 236421, Book 0519, Pages 0073 - 0081, and covering the real 
property situated in Wasatch County, State of Utah, particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a point located North 89* 20' 05" East along the section line 
31.82 feet and South 1744.64 feet the North Quarter Corner of Section 27, 
Township 3 South, Range 4 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 
00° 28' 17' East 215.65; thence South 69° 05' 09" East 6236 feet; thence South 
36° 55' 48" East 132.87 feet; thence South 32° 40' 16" East 244.09 feet; thence 
North 89° 25' 27" West 681.84 feet; thence South 00° 50' 36" East 0.78 feet; 
thence North 89° 25' 27' West 78.32 feet; thence South 00° 59' 11" East 1.59 feet; 
thence North 89° 25' IT West 64.01 feet; thence North 01° 39' 40" East 28.64 
feet; thence North OCT 24' 43" East 89.60 feet; thence South 87° 37 06" West 
104.75 feet; thence North 04° 47 34" West 87.43 feet; thence North 00" 07 37' 
West 82.44 feef thence South 89° 52* 22" West 36.93 feet; thence North 00° 07 
25" West 927 feet; thence South 89° 52' 25" West 171.03 feet; thence South 07n 
22' 52" West 83.98 feet; thence South 83° 08' 13" East 109.97 feet; thence South 
05° 50' 20" West 19.19 feet; thence North 85° 32' 22" West 20.55 feet; thence 
South 31° 03' 32" West 6932 feet; thence South 09° 53' 41" West 20.51 feet; 
thence South 14° 41' 20" East 10.13 feet; thence South 32° 37 03" East 10.00 feet; 
thence South 44° 2C 02" East 20.18 feet; thence South 61° 02' 48" East 20.12 feet; 
thence South 76° 25' 40" East 1332 feet; thence South 00° 00' 24" East 22.50 feet; 
thence South 00° (XT 35" West 3753 feet; thence West 310.41 feet; thence North 
49° 11' 05" West 62.40 feet; thence North 4 7 34' 00" West 22839 feet; thence 
North 08° 47 06" West 131.20 feet; thence North 13° 3C 57' West 220.72 feet; 
thence North 12° 24' 36" West 11.61 feet; thence Smith 89° 59' 57' East 1382.17 
feet to the point of beginning. 
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Together with all buildings all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, 
tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
now or hereafter used or enjoyed with such property or any part thereof 
Said Trus! Deed secures certain obligations under a Secured Promissory Note 
executed by Trustor as of even date with the Trust Deed in the original principal amount 
of $4,953,000 (the "Note"), bearing interest at the rale of 25% per annum, and the beneficial 
interest under the Trust Deed and the obligations secured thereby are now owned by the 
BENEFICIARY. 
That the default which has occurred is the breach of an obligation for which the 
trust property was conveyed as security and consists of the failure of Borrower to pay 
principal and interest payments under the Note since November 8, 2001 That there is 
now due and owing on the Note the sum of $8,546,106.60, at least $6372,902.40 of such 
sum accruing interest at the rate of 38% per annum. There is also due all of the expenses 
and fees of these foreclosure proceedings. 
That by reason of such default, the BENEFICIARY under such Trust Deed has 
executed and delivered to said TRUSTEE a written declaration of default and demand for 
sale, and has deposited with said TRUSTEE such Trust Deed and all documents 
evidencing the obligations secured thereby and has declared and does hereby declare all 
sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and does hereby elect 
to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured by the Trust Deed 
The default is subject to reinstatement in accordance with the Statutes of the State of Utah 
[Remainder of Page intentionally Blank - Signature Page rollows] 
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DATED August 22,2002. 
Pinnacle Title Insurance Agency, Inc. 
Name ?av<d Sfg^^XyiScn 
5505 South 900 East 
Salt Uke Oty, Utah 84117 
(801)270-0090 
STATFOFUTAH ) 
COUNTY Of SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this -* day of August, 
2002, b> T W d S\<fU,nU»\ . as \ h t i fc*v^t«*0f pinnacle Title Insurance 
Agency. Inc. a Utah corporation, TRUSTEE. 
Mv Commission Expires- U7 c\"Ol 
NOTARY PUBLIC '-' 
Residing at. Qf^ U{^<^ 
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